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INTRODUCTION
Ever since Adam Smith, economists have recognized that
nation-states play an important role in subsidizing the produc1
tion of knowledge goods. The simple case for state subsidization goes as follows: Self-interested individuals and firms will
devote their time and money toward producing knowledge
goods only up to the point that the marginal benefit they reap
from the investment exceeds the marginal cost. Yet persons
other than the producer also benefit from new knowledge
goods, and unless the producer takes the interests of these others into account, she will invest less than the socially optimal
amount. This is where nation-states enter the picture. States
can encourage the provision of knowledge goods by enhancing
the private rewards to producers or by reducing producers’
costs. By doing either (or both), nation-states can bring investment in knowledge-good provision closer to the socially optimal
level.
Smith suggested that “the easiest and most natural way in
which the state can recompense” producers of knowledge goods
is by granting them a “temporary monopoly”—that is, a patent
2
or copyright. Intellectual property (IP) rights enhance producers’ rewards by allowing them to charge higher prices. In this
respect, IP is akin to a tax on knowledge goods, with the reve3
nues going to knowledge-good producers. But IP has a poten1. By “knowledge good,” we mean (appropriating economist Hal Varian’s
definition) “anything that can be digitized.” HAL VARIAN, MARKETS FOR INFORMATION GOODS 3 (1999). Books, blueprints, films, and pharmaceutical formulas are all examples of knowledge goods. We use the term “nation-state” to
distinguish national-level actors (our “nation-states”) from subnational actors
(such as U.S. states and Canadian provinces) as well as supranational actors
(such as the United Nations and the European Union). See, e.g., ERNST B.
HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 26 (1964).
2. 3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 143–44 (4th ed. London, W. Strahan & T. Cadell 1786)
(bk. V, ch. 1, para. 119).
3. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When
Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51, 54 (2002);
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 312–14, 371–73 (2013).
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tially undesirable feature: it functions as a concentrated tax on
a subset of goods. A concentrated tax is generally less efficient
than a uniform tax on all goods (or equivalently, a tax on labor
4
income). Accordingly, scholars of law and economics often describe IP as a “second-best” mechanism for encouraging the
provision of knowledge goods—inferior to incentives financed
5
through broad-based taxation.
Notwithstanding this undesirable feature of IP, most nation-states do use patents and copyrights to recompense pro6
ducers of knowledge goods. But many nation-states simultaneously subsidize the production of knowledge goods through
7
other mechanisms, such as prizes, grants, and tax credits. Nation-states also support technological innovation by conducting
research in-house, through agencies such as the U.S. National
Institutes of Health and the U.K. National Physical Laborato8
ry. States generally fund these non-IP mechanisms through
broad-based taxes rather than concentrated taxes on certain
9
goods. For this reason, non-IP incentives in many circum4. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 314–15 (citing Steven Shavell
& Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 525, 526–627 (2001)). For a clear explanation of the equivalence between a labor income tax and a uniform tax on all goods, see Joseph Bankman
& David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an
Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1417–18 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Gene Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, International Protection
of Intellectual Property, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1635, 1640 (2004); see also Amy
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall
2014, at 131, 133 (“[M]any leading economists—including, most famously, Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow—have suggested that the most efficient
means to promote information production involves not exclusion rights but
public procurement.”). For a discussion of the compensating benefits of “user
pays” incentives like IP, see Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 350–51.
6. Following the international IP literature, we consider copyright alongside patents. But as discussed below, we are skeptical of how well the conventional economic account of IP treaties fits for creative works. Trade secrets,
while not the focus here, serve similar functions to patents. See Mark A.
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008). Trademarks have some limited similarities to public
goods, see David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 22, 24 (2006), but are best justified on other grounds, see, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV.
137, 172 (2010).
7. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 315–26.
8. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Response, Tailoring Incentives: A
Comment on Hemel and Ouellette’s Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX.
L. REV. SEE ALSO 131, 132 (2014).
9. Non-IP incentives could be financed through a sales tax on knowledge
goods, which would lead to the same inefficiency as the IP “tax.” See Hemel &
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stances may be more efficient than patents and copyrights:
they may yield the same output of knowledge goods while generating less deadweight loss (and also posing fewer deterrents
10
to cumulative innovation).
Yet the same characteristics of knowledge goods that give
rise to the argument for state subsidization also engender a
challenge for nation-states that seek to subsidize knowledge
production in an interconnected world. First, knowledge goods
are generally nonrivalrous: the fact that a person in another
country watches the same movie as you or uses the same drug
does not decrease your enjoyment of the good—and may even
11
increase it. (Antibiotics are an exception.) Second, knowledge
goods are only partially excludable: in the absence of IP law,
the producer of a knowledge good cannot always prevent others
from using the good without payment. (Think unauthorized
12
movie downloads and generic drugs.) Where the first characteristic (nonrivalrousness) is present, the global benefit from
the production of a new knowledge good is greater than the
benefit to the citizens of any one nation-state. And where the
second characteristic (nonexcludability) is present, citizens of
other countries can free-ride off the efforts of the nation-state
that pays the subsidy. Rational, self-interested nation-states
will finance knowledge goods only up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit to their own citizens.
This means that absent international coordination, nationstates will subsidize knowledge goods at less than the globally
13
optimal level.
Notably, this prediction applies to IP and non-IP innovation incentives alike. Absent coordination, rational selfOuellette, supra note 3, at 347; Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus
Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1058–59 (2014).
10. By “deadweight loss,” we mean the economic inefficiency that results
from foregone transactions when the price of a product exceeds its marginal
cost. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION & INCENTIVES 36 (2004); see also
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1059–64 (2005) (reviewing the costs of IP protection).
11. See infra note 41.
12. This is not to say that generics are costless to produce; rather, reverse
engineering a drug and relying on clinical trial data showing it is effective is
simply far cheaper than producing this knowledge in the first place. See Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug? Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 302 (2010).
13. Of course, not all knowledge goods have these characteristics requiring state intervention. See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
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interested nation-states will protect IP only insofar as the marginal benefit to their citizens from additional IP protection (in
the form of increased innovation) exceeds the marginal cost (including deadweight loss). Such states will apply a similar calculus when deciding how much to subsidize the production of
knowledge goods through broad-based taxation. This is not to
suggest that rational and self-interested nation-states will offer
no innovation inducements; rather, this logic suggests that
state investment in innovation will be globally suboptimal
(though likely not zero).
But there is one important difference between IP and nonIP incentives that alters this prediction. Most nation-states
(164 in all) have signed and ratified the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which
requires all except the least-developed countries to protect IP at
14
or above a minimum level. That is, nation-states have responded to the collective-action problem by virtually all agreeing to support the production of knowledge goods through IP
protection. There is no equivalent with respect to non-IP mechanisms—no large-scale international agreement obligating nation-states to pay for prizes, grants, tax credits, or in-house
government research. The only comprehensive solution to the
problem of knowledge-goods provision that nation-states have
struck is an IP solution.
The fact that nation-states have chosen to use international IP treaties—rather than non-IP mechanisms—to coordinate
their subsidies for knowledge-good production presents something of a puzzle: If IP protection yields greater deadweight loss
than non-IP innovation incentives, why have states settled up15
on IP as a solution to their collective-action problem? Why not,
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see
also Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated July 29, 2016); Responding to Least Developed Countries’ Special Needs in Intellectual Property,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm
(last updated Oct. 16, 2013).
15. Note that we are not asking “why” in the sense of seeking the stated
motivations of the primary actors involved in treaty negotiations. We are asking why these multinationals focused on IP rather than an alternative rentextraction tool, and why other nation-states were willing to sign on. For a
leading examination of the role of U.S. multinationals in bringing TRIPS into
being, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
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say, a global treaty requiring signatory states to allocate a percentage of gross domestic product to research and develop16
ment? Or why not, as Joseph Stiglitz has proposed, a global
prize fund financed by national governments that rewards in17
novators in targeted fields (e.g., medical knowledge)?
A possible answer is that a treaty focused on non-IP mech18
anisms is too difficult to negotiate or implement. We find this
answer unsatisfactory. True, there is no multilateral institution
capable of imposing a broad-based tax on an international basis. But by the same token, there are no international courts
capable of enforcing IP law against private actors in different
countries, and yet nation-states nonetheless have been able to
set up a global IP system. The transaction costs of negotiating a
global R&D treaty would be significant—and the subsequent
monitoring and enforcement costs even more so—but the same
can be said of any comprehensive international IP accord. And
even if non-IP mechanisms would entail higher administrative
costs, that still leaves the question of whether that administrative cost difference would exceed the greater deadweight loss of
proprietary pricing in an IP regime.
The previous paragraph assumes that deadweight loss in
an IP system exceeds deadweight loss under a non-IP alternative. That assumption is the basis for the conventional critique
of IP. While the assumption may be credible in the domestic IP
19
context, the same assumption cannot be extended to the in16. See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for
Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIO. 147 (2004) (describing a proposed
framework wherein countries directly contribute to healthcare R&D).
17. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333
BRIT. MED. J. 1279 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Thomas Alured Faunce & Hitoshi Nasu, Three Proposals for
Rewarding Novel Health Technologies Benefiting People Living in Poverty. A
Comparative Analysis of Prize Funds, Health Impact Funds and a CostEffectiveness/Competitive Tender Treaty, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 146, 149
(2008) (discussing the challenges of implementing a global R&D treaty or prize
fund); Rachel Kiddell-Monroe et al., Medical R&D Convention Derailed: Implications for the Global Health System, J. HEALTH DIPL., Aug. 2013, at 2, http://
www.ghd-net.org/abstracts/volume-1/2 (noting a breakdown in R&D treaty negotiations).
19. Even in the domestic context, nation-states can use IP as an innovation incentive while allocating access to knowledge goods through mechanisms
that generally avoid the deadweight loss associated with proprietary pricing.
See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998) (discussing patent buyouts as a means of
reducing deadweight loss). In a project in progress, we further explore the possibility of pairing IP-based innovation incentives with access allocation mech-
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ternational setting. Proprietary pricing for knowledge goods results in substantial deadweight losses, but even the strongest
international IP regime does not necessarily result in proprietary pricing for knowledge goods at the domestic level. To be
sure, the global IP regime establishes a structure for setting
the size of the rewards that innovators can claim, and it requires states to establish an IP system. But significantly, this
structure does not dictate the way that states must incentivize
knowledge production and allocate access to knowledge goods
within their own borders; in this sense, IP is merely a default.
On the supply side of the knowledge-goods equation, international IP law does not force states to adopt any one approach
for incentivizing innovation. States still can use non-IP mechanisms—prizes, grants, tax credits, and the like—to encourage
the production of knowledge. International IP law enables nation-states that subsidize the production of knowledge goods to
seek compensation from consumers elsewhere who benefit from
those goods, but—at least as a formal matter—international IP
law still leaves states wide leeway with respect to internal incentive structures. For example, a nation-state can require
prize claimants to relinquish their IP rights as a condition for
receiving the prize—and the national government can then
keep for itself future revenues from licensing the knowledge
good abroad. Less directly but more commonly, nation-states
can subsidize the domestic production of knowledge goods
through non-IP mechanisms such as grants and credits and
then collect a share of overseas profits through taxation of the
domestic producer. Global IP law creates a framework for figuring out how much State B must pay for knowledge goods generated in State A; it does not dictate the way that State A produces knowledge goods internally.
On the allocation side, states can (and often do) choose
non-price mechanisms—funded through broad-based taxation—to distribute knowledge goods at the domestic level. For
instance, a nation-state that desires to distribute a patented
pharmaceutical to its own citizens at marginal cost can purchase a license from the patentee and pay for the license
through broad-based taxation. Nation-states with single-payer
health care systems generally follow a variant of this approach,
respecting the pharmaceutical maker’s IP rights while avoiding
anisms that do not rely on proprietary pricing. See generally Daniel J. Hemel
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism (Aug. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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domestic deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. And even in
countries such as the United States without single-payer
health care, purchases of patented pharmaceutical products are
heavily subsidized by the government (e.g., through Medicare
Part D, Medicaid, and various health care-related tax expenditures). To the extent that states do allow for access allocation
through the mechanism of price, that is only because states
have not opted for non-price alternatives.
The common thread connecting the production and allocation stories—and a point that IP scholars have overlooked until
now—is that international IP law and domestic policy are separable: nation-states that sign international IP treaties such as
TRIPS are not locked into IP-based mechanisms for incentivizing innovation or allocating access to knowledge goods. Nationstates can choose to encourage innovation through non-IP
mechanisms, and they can decide to distribute knowledge goods
to their citizens at no cost or a discounted price. Even though
key features of IP law have been determined internationally,
nation-states remain central players in the provision of
knowledge goods.
To be clear, we are not arguing that policymakers consciously conceive of international IP in these terms. As scholars
such as Susan Sell have documented, the industrializedcountry policymakers behind TRIPS were largely driven by private corporate interests, and developing countries agreed to
these minimum IP standards based on promises of favorable
21
trade terms. But even if our account does not reflect the motivations of policymakers, we believe that our account does de-

20. See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. Note, however, that
states will only have full autonomy to purchase IP rights and use alternative
allocation mechanisms if they can be confident that their investments will not
be dispersed to consumers in other countries through international resale
markets. TRIPS does not currently dictate whether foreign sales exhaust domestic IP rights. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 6. The Federal Circuit recently
decided en banc to uphold the U.S. rule that foreign sales do not exhaust U.S.
patent rights. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). As we explain in a separate essay, reversal of the
current rule would undermine a key benefit of the current international system. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trade and Tradeoffs: The
Case of International Patent Exhaustion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 17, 21–
22 (2016).
21. See SELL, supra note 15, at 96 (“In effect, twelve corporations made
public law for the world.”); id. at 110 (“[D]eveloping countries received promises of greatly expanded market access for their agricultural products and textiles in exchange for agreeing to offer greater IP protection.”).
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scribe the function that international IP actually serves. International IP sets a framework for transfers from knowledge consumers to knowledge producers—and within this framework,
international IP allows nation-states to choose non-IP mechanisms on the incentive side and the allocation side, and to recoup some of the cross-border benefits of their non-IP invest22
ments. States that rely on IP at the domestic level are not
forced to do so by international law. While states must establish an infrastructure of IP laws to comply with TRIPS, they
are free to employ non-IP alternatives in addition to or instead
of IP, whether or not they realize that they have this choice.
We explain and extend this insight further, while considering a range of counterarguments and qualifications. The Article
proceeds in four Parts. Part I presents a conventional economic
narrative of international IP treaties as the solution to a global
public goods problem (drawing heavily from the work of the
23
late innovation economist Suzanne Scotchmer). In short, this
account proceeds as follows: Knowledge is a global public good,
so in the absence of global coordination such as IP treaties, nation-states will rationally underinvest in its production (the
“underinvestment hypothesis”). Coordination through IP treaties at the international level leads to harmonization of innovation policy at the domestic level, and thus excessive reliance on
IP relative to non-IP incentives (the “harmonization hypothesis”). And yet IP treaties are the only plausible means of international coordination due to the absence of a global public finance system to fund non-IP incentives such as R&D tax
credits (the “uniqueness hypothesis”). We develop a formal economic model to illustrate this account.
Part II draws on international-political-economy scholarship to show why the underinvestment hypothesis is an incomplete explanation of state behavior. The strength of the hypothesis depends on the robustness of its two premises: that
knowledge is a global public good and that states seek to maximize absolute gains. Neither of those premises is universal.
Knowledge is often not a pure public good, and the extent to
which it is a global public good depends on the dispersion of
22. Cf. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 145, 158 (Daniel M. Hausman
ed., 3d ed. 2008) (“[U]nder a wide range of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their expected returns.”).
23. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political Economy of Intellectual
Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415 (2004).
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demand for the knowledge good and the strength of positive local production externalities. Moreover, international-politicaleconomy scholars have presented a number of alternatives to
the absolute-gains model that seem to explain at least some
state investments in knowledge goods. These alternatives include a “realist” model focused on relative gains and national
security, a “constructivist” model focused on the spread of behavioral norms, and a “public choice” model emphasizing the
role of actors below the state that may use R&D-related policies
as a way to extract rents. To be sure, our analysis does not imply that the underinvestment hypothesis is categorically false.
Rather, our analysis limits the underinvestment hypothesis’s
scope—and thus focuses attention on areas in which international coordination will be most essential to knowledge produc24
tion.
Part III is where international IP treaties enter the narrative. Nation-states have chosen to use international IP laws as
a means of addressing the underinvestment problem. The harmonization hypothesis posits that coordination of IP at the international level necessarily leads states to use IP at the domestic level. In Part III, we challenge that view. We develop
the claim that international and domestic innovation policy are
separable. True, TRIPS and other international IP agreements
require signatory states to establish copyright and patent systems that meet minimum standards. Moreover, international
IP agreements obligate signatory states to treat citizens of other signatories at least as favorably as their own citizens. But
these agreements still allow individual states to adopt alternative (non-IP) arrangements for both the provision and allocation of knowledge goods at the domestic level. Our analysis also
adds a new insight to the contentious debate over the BayhDole Act and similar arrangements abroad, which allow grant
25
recipients to patent their publicly funded inventions. We explain that Bayh-Dole regimes have the overlooked benefit of allowing nation-states to internalize some of the foreign benefits
of their non-IP investments in innovation, thereby increasing
26
incentives for such investments in the first place.
24. For example, given the differing public choice dynamics in the patent
and copyright contexts, we think global underinvestment is far more likely to
be a problem for technical rather than creative works.
25. See infra notes 170, 177–82 and accompanying text.
26. We discuss this theory in more detail in a separate article. Daniel J.
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders (Aug. 19,
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Part IV then critiques the uniqueness hypothesis—the
claim that IP is the only mechanism for incentivizing innovation that can be scaled to the global level. While it is true that
there is no global public finance system, there is also no global
court system for enforcing IP rights. To be sure, treaties such
as TRIPS have set up institutions for resolving cross-border IP
disputes, but one can imagine similar structures with respect to
other innovation-incentive mechanisms. Rather than relying on
the uniqueness hypothesis to justify the international IP regime, we argue that the most compelling justification for IP
treaties is that they give each state some freedom to choose the
domestically optimal set of innovation incentives and allocation
mechanisms while also ensuring that production costs will be
shared among states in rough proportion to the benefits they
derive from knowledge goods. Moreover, the international IP
regime effectively caps the size of transfers from consumer nation-states to producer nation-states: no state must pay for
knowledge goods it does not use, and no state must pay more
than the sum total of the benefits that accrue to its citizens.
Counterintuitively, the strongest arguments in favor of the international IP regime may rest on grounds of domestic auton27
omy and distributive justice —the very grounds on which in28
ternational IP laws are commonly criticized.
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
27. This is not a defense of the current global distribution of the costs of
knowledge goods; we would favor broadening the current TRIPS exemption for
least-developed countries. But we think the current system sets a reasonable
framework for transfers among wealthier countries, and it is not obvious that
poor countries would fare better under a non-IP coordination system (indeed,
they might fare much worse).
28. See, e.g., ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (describing the “access
to knowledge movement” and various criticisms of international IP); MADHAVI
SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL
JUSTICE 173–99 (2012) (criticizing the approach to patents put in place by
TRIPS because it limits access to life-saving technological discoveries); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2832 (2006) (“Over-reliance on utility-maximization ignores distributional consequences.”); Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual
Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 51–57
(2003) (discussing human rights concerns surrounding TRIPS); Amy
Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1571–
74 (2009) (stating that “[t]he most acute criticisms of the [international IP]
trend have focused on the potential impact of TRIPS on health” and studying
how practical considerations limit countries’ autonomy to make use of the flexibilities built into TRIPS).
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Finally, we consider the implications of our argument for
the debate over domestic innovation incentives. A common concern regarding non-IP incentives is that states that subsidize
the production of knowledge goods through non-IP channels
cannot claim partial compensation from other consumer states.
For example, Suzanne Scotchmer described the efficiency gains
from IP treaties while lamenting the result of “too much intel29
lectual property” relative to non-IP incentives. But as we
show, nation-states that subsidize innovation through prizes,
grants, and tax credits can internalize the benefits conferred
upon foreign consumers to the same extent as states that rely
on IP. The international IP regime—perhaps surprisingly—
serves as a mechanism through which nation-states can recoup
some of the positive externalities that they generate through
non-IP investments. Thus our (qualified) defense of the international IP regime is not an argument for reliance on IP at the
domestic level. To the contrary, our observations regarding international IP suggest that innovation policy possibilities at the
domestic level are broader than is often believed.
I. IP TREATIES AS THE SOLUTION TO A GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS PROBLEM
This Part sets forth a conventional economic account of IP
treaties as the solution to a global public goods problem. We
begin in Part I.A with the problem of producing knowledge on
the global scale. Part I.B then describes the relative substitutability of IP and non-IP innovation incentives from the perspective of a single nation-state. Part I.C explains how states have
settled on IP treaties as a solution to this global public goods
problem. Finally, Part I.D restates this account in a formal
economic model.
A. THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE: UNCOMPENSATED EXTERNALITIES
AND FREE-RIDING
As we explained in the Introduction, the same public-goods
nature of knowledge goods that justifies state subsidies in the
first place also implies that nation-states cannot solve the
knowledge-goods problem on their own. Rational, selfinterested nation-states will subsidize knowledge production
only up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal
benefit to their own citizens, without accounting for the bene29. Scotchmer, supra note 23.
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fits of domestic knowledge production in other states. Thus,
discussions of international IP law often begin with a similar
story of externalities as the one that justifies domestic IP laws,
except that it is states rather than private firms that fail to op30
timally invest in producing knowledge goods.
There are at least two distinct accounts of why global investment in knowledge goods will be suboptimal, and the two
accounts are worth teasing apart (for reasons that will become
31
apparent below). Under the first account, which we will refer
to as the “free-rider problem,” each state strategically considers
the likely actions of others in setting its own knowledge-good
subsidies. As explained by economists Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai, in “a trading world with many countries, . . . allow[ing]
others to provide the incentives for innovation . . . avoid[s] the
32
deadweight losses in . . . home markets.” In other words, there
are some global public goods for which the payoffs seem to present a multi-player prisoners’ dilemma, with each nation-state
having an incentive to free-ride on the production of that good

30. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUPROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 93 (2007) (beginning the
section on “Policies Underlying the International IPRs System” with Joseph
Stiglitz’s argument that knowledge is a global public good); MARGO A. BAGLEY
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND POLICY 19, 21 (2013) (stating that
the “dominant justification for strong global intellectual property rights” is
based on efficient international trade, in that if “China winks at piracy of
computer programs and compact discs” then “much less incentive exists to
produce the product in the first place”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 97 (3d ed. 2012) (noting the conventional argument “that worldwide research and development investment probably falls short of its socially optimal
level, and that weak protection of intellectual property rights in developing
countries aggravates this important problem,” but questioning whether “developing countries should pay the price for increased” IP protection). In the
earliest (pre-TRIPS) extended economic treatment of international patent
agreements, Edith Penrose noted that they are beneficial only to the extent
they increase innovation, though she was skeptical at that time that foreign
patents would provide much incentive to innovators. EDITH TILTON PENROSE,
THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 127–29 (1951).
31. See infra notes 226–32 and accompanying text.
32. Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650; see also Martin J. Adelman &
Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510 (1996)
(“[S]ince patents are territorial, some countries may decide that they can win
by free-riding on the patented technology developed elsewhere without substantially slowing the march of technological development. In this way, their
societies are advantaged, although if everybody adopted this strategy, societies
worldwide would lose out as technological advancement slowed.”).
AL
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33

by other states. In such circumstances, Grossman and Lai
conclude, “a patent treaty is critical for creating incentives for
34
private innovation.”
This is not to say that trade necessarily leads nation-states
to invest less in knowledge production. While the possibility
that knowledge goods will move across borders may give rise to
the risk of free-riding, it also may increase the marginal benefit
of additional investment in R&D. This is so even if producer
states have no way to recapture the benefits from knowledge
goods consumed elsewhere. Access to knowledge generated by
Japanese researchers likely increases the productivity of U.S.
researchers (and vice versa). When the United States decides
whether to invest in a particular project, the movement of
knowledge goods across borders has two countervailing effects.
On the one hand, the payoff from such investment may be larger when U.S. researchers can stand on the shoulders of giants
elsewhere. On the other hand, the United States may have an
incentive to step back and allow other countries to take the
lead.
The free-rider account is distinct from a second account of
underinvestment in IP: the “uncompensated externalities problem.” This problem arises when each nation-state sets its subsidies for knowledge-good provision independently and nonstrategically, but still fails to account for positive externalities
generated by its own innovation effort. For example, the United
States might invest in cancer research up to the point that the
marginal benefits to U.S. cancer patients (present and future)
equal the marginal costs, without considering the benefits to
cancer patients in other countries as well. If the United States
were to consider the benefits to patients abroad when deciding
how much to invest in cancer research, then presumably the
United States would invest more. Economist Suzanne
Scotchmer emphasized that “uncompensated externalities
abroad”—benefits to consumers in other countries from a
state’s own knowledge production efforts—mean that states
“have deficient incentives to invest, relative to what is effi-

33. For the payoffs to resemble a prisoners’ dilemma, all that is necessary
is that the cost to an individual country of producing the good is greater than
the benefit to that country but less than the global benefit. See Prisoners’ Dilemma, 3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
1271–72 (R.J. Barry Jones ed., 2001).
34. Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650.
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35

cient.” Similarly, in the legal literature, John Duffy has argued that the problem of uncompensated externalities “provide[s] a particularly powerful justification for transnational
36
patent harmonization.” (As discussed further below, we think
this account is largely accurate insofar as knowledge goods are
global public goods and nation-states seek to maximize absolute gains, though we also note the account’s limits.)
Of course, both effects can occur simultaneously: a nationstate may underinvest in the provision of a particular
knowledge good both because it fails to account for external
benefits and because it expects to free-ride off the provision of
37
that knowledge good by its neighbor. But we think it is worth
explicitly disentangling these accounts because they will apply
in different situations, and they lend themselves to different so38
lutions. For now, however, the important point is that under
the standard economic account, nation-states will underinvest
in knowledge-good provision unless they can find some way to
coordinate their efforts.
B. CHOICES IN STATE SUPPORT FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
Introductory IP casebooks often begin by explaining that
patent and copyright laws increase incentives for information
production, and thus allow for more efficient provision of
39
knowledge goods by the private sector. As IP scholars have
35. Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 420.
36. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 695 (2002).
37. Scholars of international IP sometimes mention both effects without
distinguishing them. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The
Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 285 (2004) (mentioning uncompensated externalities and the choice of countries to “logically free ride on foreign R&D” as
part of the same “main reason” that “countries would tend to protect new
technology and product development at a level that is lower than would be
globally optimal”).
38. See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 18–20 (7th ed. 2012); ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
12 (6th ed. 2012) (describing the public-good nature of knowledge as a justification for awarding IP rights has a long history); JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 31, 71 (John
Bowring ed., 1843), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1922 (“He who has no hope
that he shall reap, will not take the trouble to sow. But that which one man
has invented, all the world can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the
inventor would almost always be driven out of the market . . . .”).
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realized, there are a number of caveats to this account. Most
obviously, IP sacrifices static efficiency for dynamic efficiency.
IP increases the production of knowledge goods by making
them more excludable, thereby increasing dynamic efficiency,
but this benefit comes at the cost of pricing nonrivalrous goods
above their marginal cost of zero, which reduces static efficien40
cy. Information is also rarely a pure public good. Knowledge
41
goods are often excludable even without IP, and many such
42
goods will be provided without state action, particularly as the
43
costs of production plummet in many industries. Furthermore,
creating property rights in information is only one of many
40. See Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841,
1849–50 (2014) (arguing that IP should thus be described as addressing only
an “appropriability problem” rather than a “public goods problem”). A good is
nonexcludable if no one can be excluded from its benefits, and it is
nonrivalrous if its consumption by one user does not detract from its utility for
other users (that is, there is zero marginal cost to consumption). See PAUL
KRUGMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 279 (2d ed. 2010). If a good is
nonexcludable but rival (e.g., common pool resources such as biodiversity),
consumers can free-ride on anyone who does pay, leading to “inefficiently low
production.” Id. at 280. If a good is nonrivalrous but excludable (e.g., pay-perview movies), private firms can profit by supplying it, but setting a price
greater than zero leads to “inefficiently low consumption.” Id.
41. See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability
and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1903 (2013). Although
Kapczynski and Syed frame their discussion as a critique of patents, we see no
a priori reason to believe that patents increase the variance in the fraction of
social value that inventors can capture. In the absence of patents, inventors
could still resort to secrecy, and patents can level the playing field between
inventions that are easy to keep secret and those that are not. There is less
variability in information’s nonrivalrousness, but some information may decrease in value with use. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 487–88 (2003) (arguing
that if anyone could use Mickey Mouse, “the value of the character might
plummet” because the public would “rapidly tire of ” him and “his image would
be blurred”); Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 67 (2005) (describing antibiotic resistance, which seems to us a
clear example of rival patentable knowledge).
42. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF
ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) (describing industries
in which innovation has flourished with relatively little state intervention);
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007) (describing the social benefits of non-internalized spillovers). But there
is little serious challenge to the claim that many knowledge goods will not be
produced without some state-facilitated transfer to the producer, and our argument is focused on those cases.
43. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 99–106
(2006) (describing the development of free software products).
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ways to compensate providers of knowledge goods. Alternatively, states can subsidize the production of knowledge goods
through prizes, grants, and tax incentives (such as tax credits
44
for R&D and special deductions for qualified artists).
In previous work, we have analyzed the advantages and
disadvantages of these various mechanisms from the perspec45
tive of a single nation-state. We explained that no one incentive (or mix of incentives) strictly dominates for all forms of
knowledge production; rather, optimal innovation policy is context specific. IP is particularly well suited to cases in which
capital markets operate efficiently, potential innovators are
risk-neutral, and the relevant knowledge good is considered a
luxury. In all cases, the choice of innovation incentive will depend on the nature of the knowledge goods in question and on
46
the society’s goals and distributional preferences.
44. Performing artists can claim a deduction for unreimbursed expenses
even when they take the standard deduction, while employees in most other
lines of work only can claim a deduction for unreimbursed employee expenses
if they itemize deductions on their tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 62(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B) (2012).
45. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3. Although our prior work focused on
incentives for patentable knowledge, our framework also applies to other
knowledge goods such as artistic works, though the dimensions of our framework suggest that optimal incentives will look very different for most creative
works than for technical inventions. For an example of a tax incentive for creative works, see 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(2), which allows deductions for a “qualified
performing artist.” For federal grant opportunities for artists, see Grants,
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/grants (last visited
Oct. 13, 2016). Governments also use tax incentives to support movie production. See, e.g., Paul Krekorian, To Keep ‘Hollywood’ in Hollywood, Tax Incentives Are Key, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op
-ed/la-oe-krekorian-film-tax-credit-20140714-story.html; Etan Vlessing, Mark
Wahlberg to Canada: Restore Film Tax Breaks for Hollywood, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/mark-wahlberg
-canada-restore-film-398637; see also infra note 69 (noting other grants and
tax incentives for the arts).
46. In short, we argued that every state transfer to spur knowledge production embodies the answers to three questions: (1) Who decides the size of
the transfer? Does the state tailor the reward on a project-by-project basis (as
with direct spending and fixed prizes)? Or does it simply establish technologyneutral ground rules (as with IP and tax incentives), which leverage private
information about potential projects? (2) When does the transfer occur? Only
ex post to successful projects (as with prizes and IP), providing a strong incentive for success? Or are projects funded before their results are known (as with
grants and tax incentives), which might be more effective when producers are
risk averse and capital constrained? (3) Who pays? Do all taxpayers fund the
transfer (as with grants, prizes, and tax incentives), or only users of the resulting information (as with IP)? We argue that whether “user pays” is normatively attractive will vary with the technology, and that in theory, “user pays”
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From the perspective of the state, one of the key distinctions between IP and other knowledge-production incentives is
that IP-mediated transfers to artists and innovators are for the
most part not reflected in government budgets. The higher
prices on IP-protected goods can be considered a “shadow”
tax—equivalent to a targeted sales tax on these goods—and IP
laws can be viewed as “shadow” expenditures that transfer the47
se rewards to producers.
The other mechanisms, in contrast, are funded through
conventional public finance. From the consumer’s perspective,
of course, there is little difference between paying $100 in
higher prices on IP-protected products and paying $100 in
higher taxes that are used to fund mechanisms such as prizes,
48
grants, and tax credits. But the interchangeability of IP and
other transfer mechanisms depends on the existence of a state
that can use conventional public finance mechanisms. In the
global context, there is no single worldwide governance body
that has authority to impose taxes, and thus no straightforward way to replicate the effect of IP through a tax-and-spend
regime.
C. THE IP SOLUTION
In theory, nation-states could address the problem of underinvestment in knowledge goods by coordinating on any of
the mechanisms discussed in Part I.B. In practice, however, IP
has emerged as the primary solution to this global coordination
dilemma. In the conventional economic account, treaties such
as TRIPS help solve the underprovision problem by requiring
states to bear the costs of knowledge production to the extent
that they use knowledge goods produced under IP laws.
Efforts at multilateral coordination on IP date to the
1880s, when numerous nations negotiated the Berne Convention on copyright law and the Paris Convention on patent and
trademark law, which are administered by an organization now

could be incorporated into other reward mechanisms. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 327–52.
47. Id. at 312–13, 371–73.
48. As currently implemented, non-IP incentives tend to be funded
through broad-based taxation in which users cross-subsidize each others’
knowledge goods, but as we’ve explained, this is a distinct third dimension in
innovation policy space. Id. at 327–52. The administrative costs of each system
also will vary with implementation; for estimates of current costs in the United States see id. at 361–67.
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known as the World Intellectual Property Organization
49
(WIPO). These agreements required some minimum level of
IP protection (e.g., the Berne Convention set a minimum copy50
right term of life-of-the-author plus fifty years), and they established the norm of “national treatment”—that every member must give nationals of other members treatment no less
51
favorable than their own. As Graeme Dinwoodie notes, “This
basic structure—national treatment plus substantive minima—
has persisted throughout the twentieth century,” with the minimum IP standards gradually being “revised upwards” from
52
their initially “undemanding” levels.
The most significant upward revision came when TRIPS
was negotiated in 1994 through the World Trade Organization
53
(WTO). The heightened standards of TRIPS must be met by
every WTO member nation, which now includes most of the
54
world (including every high-income country). For example,
TRIPS requires countries to offer twenty-year patents “in all
fields of technology” and to have trade secret laws that protect
55
certain “undisclosed information.” More recently, countries including the United States have pushed for further increases in
global IP protection through bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), signed in 2011 (but then rejected by the European Parliament), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), on which
participants reached agreement in October 2015 after conten49. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (revised July 24, 1971), S.
TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 303 (revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]; see
WIPO—A Brief History, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
about-wipo/en/history.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
50. Berne Convention, supra note 49, art. 7(1).
51. Id. at art. 5(1); Paris Convention, supra note 49, art. 2(1).
52. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 993, 995 (2002).
53. TRIPS, supra note 14. For an account of how nation-states jockey for
favorable forums for IP treaty negotiations—and an important reminder of
how messily economic theories play out in the real world—see Laurence R.
Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
54. See Members and Observers, supra note 14.
55. TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 27(1), 33, 39. For an overview of other
changes, see J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29
INT’L L. 345 (1995).
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tious negotiations (but which may still fail during ratifica56
tion).
To be sure, not all scholars agree that the upward ratcheting of IP protection under TRIPS and other agreements has
been a positive development. TRIPS has been criticized for im57
peding access to knowledge and development, for having been
58
unfairly imposed on developing countries, and for limiting pol59
icy experimentation and regulatory competition. Some commentators have argued that TRIPS should be supplemented or
replaced by different global R&D agreements. For example, Joseph Stiglitz has argued that “basic research and many other
fundamental forms of knowledge are not, and almost certainly
should not be, protected by an intellectual property regime,”
and therefore “[i]n these areas efficiency requires public sup60
port,” which “must be at the global level.” There have also
61
been calls for supplemental R&D treaties in the public health

56. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011).
57. See Kapczynski, supra note 28, at 1571–72.
58. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 15, at 9–10; Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and
Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or a Small Step Forward?, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 199–200.
59. See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS, A
NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 115 (2012); Duffy, supra note 36, at 721; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 86
(2015).
60. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 320
(Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
61. Tim Hubbard and James Love advocate an “R&D contribution norm,
established by treaty.” Hubbard & Love, supra note 16, at 150. Under the
Health Impact Fund proposed by Aidan Hollis and Thomas Pogge, pharmaceutical manufacturers could opt in to a global prize scheme, for which they propose a minimum funding level of $6 billion (allocated based on gross national
income). AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 44 (2008), http://www
.healthimpactfund.org/Old/hif_book.pdf. For similar arguments in favor of a
global health R&D treaty, see Nicoletta Dentico & Nathan Ford, The Courage
To Change the Rules: A Proposal for an Essential Health R&D Treaty, PLOS
MED., Feb. 2005, at 96; Suerie Moon et al., Innovation and Access to Medicines
for Neglected Populations: Could a Treaty Address a Broken Pharmaceutical
R&D System?, PLOS MED., May 2012, at 1. Movement toward a global health
R&D treaty at the World Health Organization has been unsuccessful. See
CONSULTATIVE EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON RESEARCH & DEV., WORLD HEALTH
ORG., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING GLOBAL FINANCING AND COORDINATION (2012),
http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_Report_5_April_2012.pdf (recommending a
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62

and climate arenas. But these critiques generally do not challenge the dominant narrative that international coordination is
necessary; rather, they argue for non-IP forms of collective action. Stiglitz is clear, for instance, that “[k]nowledge is a global
public good” and that “global public goods provide a central ra63
tionale for international collective action.”
Despite these critiques of TRIPS and calls for global R&D
treaties, IP might seem like the most natural solution to the
collective-action problem facing nation-states because there is
no world government that can set global taxes to support conventional public finance mechanisms. Scotchmer argued that
states coordinate on IP due to the lack of “institutions to har64
monize public spending.” She elaborated that “[t]here is no
analogous institution [to IP treaties] for making public spon65
sors account for cross-border spillovers.”
Scotchmer was not, however, pleased with what she saw as
the inevitable implication of this necessary global coordination
on IP, which she summarized as follows:
[H]armonization [of global IP laws] will not solve all the efficiency
problems that arise from independent policy making. Perhaps the
most important problem arises when we recognize that for some investments, public spending is the most efficient way to fund R&D. . . .
But since public funding agencies will not be inclined to take account
of benefits generated abroad, the incentives to provide public spending will be deficient. In contrast, harmonized intellectual property
protections allow countries to recoup some of the benefits they confer
on foreign consumers. This may lead to an international system that
relies more heavily on intellectual property than is efficient, especially when it is recognized that public spending on R&D is an extensive
66
and efficient practice.

In sum, the account of global IP treaties presented above
proceeds as follows: Knowledge is a global public good, so nation-states will rationally underinvest in its production unless
there is coordination at the global level (which we refer to as
the “underinvestment hypothesis”). Global coordination on IP
binding instrument for health R&D funding); Kiddell-Monroe et al., supra note
18 (describing the derailment of this process).
62. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough” Technologies, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 25 (2006); Daniel Bodansky, Climate Commitments: Assessing the Options, in BEYOND KYOTO 37, 43 (Joseph E. Aldy et al.
eds., 2003); Heleen de Coninck et al., International Technology-Oriented
Agreements To Address Climate Change, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 335, 348 (2008).
63. Stiglitz, supra note 60, at 320.
64. Scotchmer, supra note 23.
65. Id. at 420.
66. Id. at 436.
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dictates how states incentivize innovation and allocate
knowledge goods domestically, leading to reliance on IP at the
expense of other mechanisms such as prizes, grants, and tax
credits (the “harmonization hypothesis”). And IP is the only
plausible solution for this collective-action problem due to the
lack of a global public finance system to support other mechanisms such as grants, prizes, and tax incentives (the “uniqueness hypothesis”).
In the following three Parts, we argue that each step of
this logic is incomplete. But first, we restate the classical economic account in formal terms so that each step in the logic can
be rendered more precise.
D. A FORMAL ECONOMIC MODEL
We begin with a rudimentary model featuring some number of states—SA, SB, SC, and so on—each of which is a potential
producer and potential consumer of knowledge goods. Let x be
the level of investment in production of the relevant knowledge
good. Let BA(x) be the benefit to consumers in SA from investment of x in the relevant good assuming that the good is freely
available to consumers in SA; let BB(x) be the benefit to consumers in SB from investment of x in the good (again assuming free
availability), and so on, such that Bglobal is the sum of all Bs for
all nation-states. Finally, let C(x) represent the cost of investing x. Assume that investment in the production of the
knowledge good is subject to the law of diminishing marginal
returns, such that B′(x) > 0 and B″(x) < 0.
From a global welfare perspective, the optimal level of investment (xglobal*) occurs when Bglobal′(xglobal*) = C′(xglobal*), which is
when the marginal benefit from any additional investment
equals the marginal cost. However, SA only has an incentive to
invest up to xA* such that BA′(xA*) = C′(xA*). If BA < Bglobal, then
xA* < xglobal*. SA may even invest less than xA* if it suspects that
it can rely on investments by other countries, but if BA is the
largest Bi, no individual country will have an incentive to increase total global investment beyond xA*. Total global investment will thus be below the global optimum.
States can address this inefficiency by establishing a
mechanism whereby consumer states will compensate SA when
a knowledge good produced in SA is consumed elsewhere. So, for
example, if diabetes patients in SB benefit from a good generated in SA, the patients or the government of SB will make a payment to an SA-based firm. (The payment will go directly to the
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government of SA if the relevant patent is state-owned; otherwise, the government of SA will claim a portion of the payment
through taxation of the firm.) Let TBA represent the transfer
payment that SB (or its citizens) makes to SA (or an SA-based
firm) as partial compensation to SA for developing the relevant
knowledge good.
The international IP regime serves as a mechanism for setting TBA. If a knowledge good is produced in SA and demand for
the good exists among SB’s citizens, SB cannot simply appropriate the knowledge good for its own use; it must compensate SA.
In the absence of a licensing agreement, SB must allow SA to sell
the knowledge good to consumers in SB at a monopoly price (the
monopoly being conferred by IP law). Let PB|monopoly be the profits
that SA (or the SA-based firm) will earn from selling the
knowledge good at a monopoly price in SB, and let BB|monopoly(x) be
the benefit to consumers in SB from access to the good at a monopoly price. Absent perfect price discrimination, some consumers in SB who could benefit from the good will be unwilling
or unable to pay the monopoly price; thus, BB|monopoly(x) < BB(x),
and TBA = PB|monopoly < BB|monopoly(x). If the SA-based firm can pricediscriminate perfectly, then TBA = PB|monopoly = BB|monopoly(x) =
BB(x).
We return to this model below. But before doing so, we interrogate key assumptions underlying the model—namely, that
states are rational actors and that knowledge goods are global
public goods.
II. WHY DO NATION-STATES INVEST IN KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCTION?
The public-goods framework presented in Part I predicts
that without an international coordination mechanism, nationstates will underinvest in knowledge goods. Testing this prediction is virtually impossible: to say that states “underinvest” in
knowledge goods, we would have to know the optimal amount
of public investment in knowledge goods. That amount is, of
course, unknown (and likely unknowable). Moreover, the underinvestment hypothesis generated by the public-goods
framework is not falsified by the fact that states do invest in
information production beyond what international agreements
require; after all, the public-goods framework predicts underinvestment rather than no investment.
We can observe that in practice, there are tremendous
state transfers to information producers beyond what is re-
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quired by international law. In 2010, for instance, the governments of seven countries—the United States, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, China, Japan, and South Korea—spent
more than $272 billion in the aggregate on direct R&D support
67
(not including tax incentives). This direct support for R&D
comes on top of the indirect subsidy for R&D required by international IP law. Indeed, direct U.S. government support for
R&D quite likely exceeds the size of the patent “shadow tax” in
68
the United States. Governments also spend significant sums
69
to encourage creative works. Again, this does not disprove the
underinvestment hypothesis, but it may cause one to question
whether the conventional economic account fully captures the
reasons why states invest in innovation.
Recall that the underinvestment hypothesis rests on two
premises: (1) knowledge is a global public good; and (2) nationstates rationally underinvest in global public goods. While we
cannot test the underinvestment hypothesis by comparing actual investment to optimal investment (because we cannot determine the latter figure), we can evaluate the robustness of

67. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2014
app. at tbl.4-14, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/content/chapter-4/at04
-14.pdf.
68. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 320–21, 322–25, 371–72 (noting as of 2013 that the federal government spends in the range of $140–$150
billion per year on R&D and R&D-related tax incentives, more than double the
estimated amount of domestically earned corporate income from patents and
trade secrets).
69. In the mid-1990s, direct public expenditure on the arts in the United
States was about $1.5 billion per year, which was substantially less per capita
than in many other industrialized nations: Germany spent $6.9 billion, France
spent $3.3 billion, the United Kingdom spent $1.5 billion, and Canada spent
$1.3 billion. See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, INTERNATIONAL DATA ON
GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON THE ARTS 9, tbl.1 (Jan. 2000) http://www.arts.gov/
sites/default/files/74.pdf. Classifying “the arts” is difficult; these estimates did
not include spending on libraries, arts training, capital expenditures (e.g.,
building a new theater), or tax incentives. Id. at 2. Lea Shaver notes that public support for book provision includes support for universities that employ
and train many authors, direct purchase of textbooks by education departments (or by students using public financial aid), and purchases of books by
libraries—which alone costs taxpayers a billion dollars per year in the United
States. Lea Shaver, The Right To Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 51
(2015). Cultural production is also supported through tax incentives. See
NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, HOW THE UNITED STATES FUNDS THE ARTS
18–24 (3d ed. 2012), http://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/how-the-us-funds
-the-arts.pdf; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing additional tax incentives).
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the premises on which the hypothesis rests. We do so in this
Part.
We have already noted that knowledge is rarely a pure
70
public good. In Part II.A, we consider the extent to which
knowledge is in fact a global public good. We suggest that
“globalness” is a matter of degree: while demand for some
knowledge goods is dispersed across countries, demand for other knowledge goods is highly concentrated in one or a small
number of locations. We also consider evidence that the production of knowledge goods yields positive local production externalities: in this respect, knowledge production is an activity
that generates distinct local and global benefits. We argue that
the strength of the underinvestment hypothesis varies with the
dispersion of demand and the magnitude of positive local production externalities: when demand is highly concentrated and
positive local production externalities are significant, nationstates will rationally invest in knowledge production at close to
globally optimal levels.
In Part II.B, we examine the second premise on which the
underinvestment hypothesis rests: the claim that nationstates—as self-interested rational actors—will underinvest in
the production of global public goods. For decades, scholars of
domestic and political economy have debated whether nationstates are in fact self-interested rational actors. One variant of
the rational-actor model, “realism,” posits that nation-states
are engaged in a competition with each other for security, and
that they seek to maximize relative (rather than absolute)
gains. Realism is especially helpful for understanding state
spending on knowledge goods related to national-security concerns (such as the substantial spending on the space race), but
the realist approach also suggests that states may have incentives to invest in knowledge goods with no immediate defense
application. An alternative to the rational-actor model, “constructivism,” sees states as actors whose identities and interests are constructed by social interactions. In the constructivist
model, states do not single-mindedly seek material gains; rather, their actions are shaped by behavioral norms, such as the
norm that spending on science is something that states are
“supposed to do.” Finally, public choice theory (along with its
international-political-economy cousin, “liberal intergovernmentalism”) focuses on actors below the state, such as domestic in-

70. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
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terest groups that may seek to extract rents through R&Drelated policies.
Unsurprisingly, these different perspectives yield different
conclusions as to why states invest in knowledge production—
and different predictions as to whether investment will approach optimal levels. However, they all suggest that the conventional account in the IP literature overlooks important dimensions of the knowledge-production problem. This is not to
imply that international IP treaties are unnecessary; rather,
our analysis of the underinvestment hypothesis is aimed at
identifying the conditions under which the conventional economic account will be most applicable.
A. IS KNOWLEDGE A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD?
As noted above, the underinvestment hypothesis proceeds
from the premise that knowledge is a global public good. A
global public good, like other public goods, is nonrivalrous and
71
nonexcludable. The distinguishing feature of a global public
good is that its benefits transcend national borders. IP scholars
often state categorically that information and knowledge are
72
global public goods. In this Section, we examine the extent to
which benefits from knowledge goods—benefits from consumption and from positive production externalities—are in fact
global.
1. Dispersion of Demand
For some knowledge goods, demand is largely domestic.
And with respect to these goods, the coordination challenges
outlined in Part I are less daunting. Consider the cranberry.
Over three-quarters of the world’s cranberries are grown in the
73
United States, and nearly three-quarters of U.S.-grown cran-

71. See KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 40.
72. See, e.g., Dana Dalrymple, Scientific Knowledge as a Global Public
Good: Contributions to Innovation and the Economy, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 35, 36
(2003); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121,
156 (“[R]ecent scholarship in economics and law . . . identifies knowledge as a
global public good . . . .”); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1714 (2008) (“[K]nowledge is a global
public good . . . .”).
73. See FAOStat, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://
faostat3.fao.org/browse/Q/QC/E (select “Cranberries”) (last visited Oct. 13,
2016).
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74

berries are consumed domestically. So questions related to the
health effects of cranberries are primarily of concern to U.S.
producers and consumers—other countries that don’t produce
or consume cranberries in significant quantities have much less
75
interest in the issue. Unsurprisingly, the United States is the
only country that has invested significantly in cranberryrelated R&D: the U.S. National Institutes of Health has target76
ed cranberry-related research as a funding priority since 2005.
Cranberry-related knowledge appears to be nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable (so technically a public good); but with only the
United States (and, to a lesser extent, Canada) having a significant stake in the issue, cranberry-related R&D does not pose a
77
major international coordination challenge.
Other examples are not hard to come by. Roughly three78
quarters of the world’s tornados occur in the United States, so
lack of international coordination with respect to tornadorelated R&D is probably not a significant problem (even though
tornado-related knowledge probably is nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable). Moyamoya disease occurs primarily in the
Japanese population—Japan has over fifty times as many cases
79
as the rest of the world combined —so it is unlikely that global
coordination challenges will lead the Japanese government to
underinvest in Moyamoya-disease-related research. Indeed,

74. See Tom Moroney & Brian K. Sullivan, U.S. Cranberry Growers Give
Thanks as Sales Rise in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www
.nytimes.com/2006/11/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-berry.3633021.html.
75. To be sure, if it turns out that cranberries have a large positive health
effect such as curing cancer, then they might be more widely consumed. See
generally SUSAN PLAYFAIR, AMERICA’S FOUNDING FRUIT: THE CRANBERRY IN A
NEW ENVIRONMENT 14–16 (2014) (describing research on cranberries’ cancerfighting properties).
76. See Programs and Projects, UMASS DARTMOUTH CRANBERRY HEALTH
RESEARCH CTR., http://www.umassd.edu/chrc/programsampprojects (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
77. This does not mean that cranberries will have no economic effects outside the United States; foreign firms may choose to invest in the U.S. agricultural industry, perhaps at the encouragement of the U.S. government. Our
point is simply that if demand for a knowledge good is geographically concentrated in one country, then the good does not present the same problem of uncompensated externalities discussed above.
78. See Kathryn Prociv, From Domestic to International: Tornadoes
Around the World, U.S. TORNADOES (July 25, 2013), http://www.ustornadoes
.com/2013/07/25/from-domestic-to-international-tornadoes-around-the-world.
79. See Yoshiharu Matshushima, Moyamoya Disease, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY 1053, 1053 (A. Leland Albright et al.
eds., 1999).
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knowledge goods of this type (we will call them “cranberry
goods”) might be the modal case. Most patent applicants only
seek to patent in a single jurisdiction; for example, patent filing
data suggests that about two-thirds of USPTO applications are
80
only filed in the United States. And even when the benefits of
knowledge production are not as limited geographically, there
are some challenges that are so important to a single country
that the country’s government is likely to take on the challenge
itself rather than free-riding off the efforts of others (e.g., flood
81
control in the Netherlands).
Certain creative works may resemble the “cranberry good”
prototype to an even greater degree. More than ninety-six per82
cent of Swedish speakers live in Sweden, so one might expect
the government of Sweden to have an incentive to invest close
to xglobal* in Swedish-language literature and lyrical music. (To
be sure, some Swedish-language books and songs may reach a
much wider audience via translation, as Stieg Larsson and
ᗅᗺᗷᗅ can attest.) The United Kingdom may have entirely adequate incentives to invest in the production of new recipes for
83
steak and kidney pie (though perhaps the case for global coordination is stronger with respect to the production of crime
dramas starring Benedict Cumberbatch).
And for some creative works, the public goods framework is
almost entirely inapplicable because the relevant knowledge is
inextricably tied to a rivalrous and excludable good. (No two
individuals can have the same original Jeff Koons balloon dog
80. See IP5 STATISTICS REPORT: 2014 EDITION 49 tbl.3 (2015), http://www
.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/ip5sr2014.pdf (reporting that roughly sixty-six percent of U.S. applicants with a 2010 priority filing
year did not file elsewhere, compared with fifty-seven percent for the European Patent Office, seventy-two percent for Japan, ninety-six percent for China,
eighty-three percent for applicants in South Korea, and seventy-seven percent
for applicants elsewhere). These figures might be explained in large part by
the high cost of foreign filing and enforcement rather than the geographic concentration of demand. See MARKETA TRIMBLE, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF
TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 35 (2012) (explaining why “obtaining parallel
patents is . . . difficult and costly” and only feasible for large companies).
81. See Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a Flood-Prone Land, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/europe/
netherlands-sets-model-of-flood-prevention.html (discussing Dutch preeminence in flood-related research).
82. See Swedish, ETHNOLOGUE, http://www.ethnologue.com/language/swe
(last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
83. See, e.g., Anthony Worall Thompson, Steak and Kidney Pie, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/food/recipes/steakandkidneypie_73308 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016).
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sculpture in their living room—unless they share a living
84
room.)
Global coordination is more essential with respect to
knowledge goods for which demand is widely dispersed—think
of information about earthquake dynamics or wind energy. In
terms of rivalrousness and excludability, knowledge in these
fields may be no different from knowledge about the treatment
of Moyamoya disease and the tracking of tornados. But freeriding incentives are much stronger. The United States knows
that it can rely on the results of earthquake-related research
from Japan and wind-energy research from Germany. And Japan and Germany face a similar incentive structure. Moreover,
even without opportunistic free-riding, the problem of uncompensated externalities remains. The United States will rationally invest in knowledge production up to the point that the
marginal benefits (to the U.S.) equal the marginal costs, but
the marginal benefits to the United States of wind energyrelated knowledge represent only a fraction of the marginal
global benefits; accordingly, the United States will set its investment level below the point at which marginal global bene85
fits equal costs (and other countries will do the same).
Based on a rational-actor model of state behavior, then,
aggregate global investment in R&D will be closer to the socially optimal level with respect to knowledge goods for which demand is concentrated in one or a small number of industrialized nations. (When the demand for goods is localized only to
developing countries that cannot afford to produce the goods,
local knowledge goods may prove more difficult to finance than
86
global knowledge goods.) If the benefits of a knowledge good
84. See Katya Kazakina and Philip Boroff, Koons’s Puppy Sets $58 Million
Record for Living Artist, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2013-11-13/koons-s-puppy-sets-58-million-record-for-living
-artist.
85. It is important to distinguish between knowledge goods that are primarily enjoyed in a single country (e.g., cranberry-related research) and the
“local public goods” of Tieboutian theory. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (mentioning
beaches, parks, municipal golf courses, police protection, roads, and parking
facilities as examples of local public goods). Residents of other nations are in
no way excluded (by law or by distance) from enjoying the benefits of local
knowledge goods. What makes a knowledge good “local” is that demand is geographically concentrated.
86. See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 89 (2004). For example, R&D on neglected diseases that primarily affect populations with low
purchasing power is less likely to be funded than R&D on diseases that also
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are localized, the government of a single country (or a small set
of countries) will likely have an incentive to invest in R&D at or
near the socially optimal level. If demand is dispersed, the
marginal benefit of R&D investment for any one country is only
a fraction of the marginal global benefit, and the free-rider
problem is more severe.
2. Local Production Externalities
Even where demand for information is dispersed, the problem of producing global knowledge goods may be mitigated by
the presence of positive local production externalities. Local
production externalities arise when a nearby third party is affected (positively or negatively) by the production of a good or
service and when the third party neither charges nor pays the
producer commensurately. For example, a slaughterhouse
might impose a negative production externality on its neighbors, while a bakery might impose a positive local production
87
externality (the smell of fresh bread).
Knowledge generation may result in positive local produc88
tion externalities as well. California’s Silicon Valley serves as
an illustration. Early firms in the area attracted workers with
skills relevant to the semiconductor industry, providing a pool
of potential employees with industry-specific knowledge for fu89
ture ventures. The early firms also attracted investors to Sili90
con Valley, leading to the growth of the venture capital sector.
These factors meant that by the late 1960s, the cost of producing semiconductor-related knowledge goods was lower in Silicon Valley than elsewhere. Thus, the cost to Intel of developing
affect the wealthiest countries, even when the neglected diseases have a higher human cost.
87. See, e.g., Nicolas Guéguen, The Sweet Smell of . . . Implicit Helping:
Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Spontaneous Help in Shopping
Malls, 152 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397 (2012) (finding correlation between pleasant
smells and altruism).
88. For an argument that sub-national governments can internalize many
of the benefits of their public spending on innovation, see Camilla Alexandra
Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2670400.
89. See David P. Angel, High-Technology Agglomeration and the Labor
Market: The Case of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE
ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 124, 130 (Martin Kenney ed.,
2000).
90. See Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, Venture Capital in Silicon Valley: Fueling New Firm Formation, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra
note 89, at 98, 107–09.
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a four-bit central processing unit circa 1971 was likely lower in
northern California than it would have been in, say, North Dakota; Intel had access to skilled workers who had acquired industry-specific knowledge at other firms, as well as access to
potential sources of capital. In this way, efforts by the early
firms in Silicon Valley (e.g., Hewlett-Packard and Fairchild
Semiconductor) yielded positive local production externalities
from which subsequent entrants (e.g., Intel and Apple) benefit91
ted.
Putting this into the public-goods framework, one might
say that semiconductor-related research in Silicon Valley in the
1960s yielded benefits with different degrees of globalness. The
microprocessor is certainly not a cranberry-type good: demand
92
is widely dispersed. On the other hand, the positive production externalities of semiconductor-related research were geographically concentrated: firms in Silicon Valley could benefit
from improved access to skilled labor, knowhow, and capital in
ways that firms in Switzerland could not. In other words, Silicon Valley firms had geographically sticky complementary assets that made investments in knowledge about, say, new semiconductor architectures far more valuable in that
geographically concentrated region than outside it, regardless
of whether the knowledge was free for other regions to copy.
93
The story of Silicon Valley is (largely) a story of positive
local production externalities generated by private activity, but
public R&D spending can likewise lead to positive local produc94
tion externalities. Consider the case of Huntsville, Alabama,
91. On positive local production externalities, see generally Paul
Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483
(1991).
92. This was not always the case. In the 1970s, Tim Berners-Lee tried to
sell circuit boards with early microprocessors in Oxford (before later going on
to invent the World Wide Web), but he was not as successful as Steve Jobs and
Steve Wozniak were with a similar endeavor in Silicon Valley partly because
Oxford did not have the demand supplied by Silicon Valley computer hobbyist
groups. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 407 (2014). Other knowledge
goods may similarly shift from cranberry-type goods to more global public
goods over time.
93. While most accounts of Silicon Valley’s success have focused on individual entrepreneurs, public funds also played a key role. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (1999) (discussing the role of government funding in the
computer revolution); Stuart W. Leslie, The Biggest “Angel” of Them All: The
Military and the Making of Silicon Valley, in UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY, supra note 89, at 48, 50.
94. See, e.g., Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, The Emergence of Israel’s
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home to NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center since 1960. The
NASA center has attracted thousands of physicists, engineers,
and other highly skilled workers to Huntsville; by one measure,
Huntsville ranks second in the nation in the number of high95
tech workers per capita (behind only Silicon Valley). Several
former NASA employees have gone on to found startups of their
own; these new ventures benefit from access to Huntsville’s
highly skilled labor pool and close connections with basic re96
searchers at NASA. Larger companies that value proximity to
U.S. military and NASA facilities (including Boeing, Northrop
Grumman, and Lockheed Martin) have established substantial
97
presences in the Huntsville area as well. Some of the
knowledge generated by research at the Marshall Space Flight
Center meets the definition of a global public good: the Hubble
Space Telescope is perhaps the most prominent example of a
project pursued at Marshall that has yielded benefits for researchers worldwide. At the same time, many of the economic
benefits of R&D spending at Marshall are concentrated in the
98
surrounding area.
Some argue that the incentive to attract mobile capital
may lead jurisdictions to invest in knowledge goods at levels
above the social optimum. For instance, Israel may lure Intel to
set up a new facility south of Tel Aviv by offering tax incen-

Venture Capital Industry: How Policy Can Influence High-Tech Cluster Dynamics, in CLUSTER GENESIS: TECHNOLOGY-BASED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 172 (Pontus Braunerhjelm & Maryann Feldman eds., 2006); Martha
Prevezer & Han Tang, Policy-Induced Clusters: The Genesis of Biotechnology
Clustering on the East Coast of China, in CLUSTER GENESIS, supra, at 113.
95. See TECHAMERICA FOUND., CYBERCITIES 2010: THE DEFINITIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY IN THE NATION’S TOP 60 CITIES 8 (2010).
96. See, e.g., NASA, NASA’S IMPACT IN ALABAMA: A TECH TRANSFER PERSPECTIVE
(2012),
https://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/economic-impacts/
Alabama_NASA-Economic-Impacts.pdf.
97. See Leading Employers Huntsville/Madison County, CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF HUNTSVILLE/MADISON CNTY., http://www.huntsvillealabama
usa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=194&Itemid=355
(last updated June 2016).
98. Similarly, public investments in technology infrastructure—such as
the U.S. broadband sales tax exemption or direct funding of the U.S. National
Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network—provide benefits to local industry
that are difficult for other jurisdictions to appropriate. See Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 3, at 332 & n.140; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Nanotechnology and
Innovation Policy, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 33, 69 (2015). These kinds of infrastructure investments lower the costs of knowledge production for firms located close enough to use them, which draws technology producers to the area.
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tives, but little is gained from a global welfare perspective if
the new facility in Israel simply replaces one in California. Indeed, studies of U.S. states provide some evidence of a “beggar100
thy-neighbor” effect from state tax incentives for R&D. Theoretical work similarly suggests that international competition
may lead to supraoptimal subsidies for R&D under certain cir101
cumstances.
We are agnostic as to whether this story of overinvestment
due to local production externalities is a plausible one. To see
why it might not be, consider again the example of bakeries
that generate a positive local production externality—the smell
of fresh bread. We can imagine residents banding together to
subsidize bakeries in their neighborhood, and we can imagine
bakeries moving from one neighborhood to another in order to
capture such subsidies. But would this lead to too much production of bread? It is not obvious why subsidies would lead to
overproduction. No resident group would have an incentive to
offer a subsidy larger than the local production externality (i.e.,
the benefit that the bakery brings to the neighborhood). Resident groups that place a higher value on the smell of bread
might bid to lure bakeries to their neighborhoods, but this
would likely lead to an even more efficient geographic distribution of bakeries—with bread being baked in the areas that appreciate it most.
To be sure, one can construct a model in which subsidies
are supraoptimal. Let’s say that the supply of bread is inelastic;
thus, the subsidy from residents to bakeries is a pure transfer,
with no effect on output. But if the subsidy is financed through
a mechanism (such as a tax) that itself yields deadweight loss,
then the subsidy is in that sense supraoptimal: something is
lost and nothing is gained. Why, though, would we expect the
supply of bread (or of knowledge goods) to be inelastic? And
even if supply is inelastic, subsidies may have efficiencyenhancing effects: they may spur bakeries (or analogously,

99. See, e.g., David Shamah, How Intel Came To Be Israel’s Best Tech
Friend, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/how
-intel-came-to-be-israels-best-tech-friend.
100. See, e.g., Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-ofState, and Aggregate Effects of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 431
(2009).
101. See Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 707 (1983) (discussing the
importance of R&D subsidies to domestic welfare).
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knowledge producers) to relocate to the areas in which the local
production externalities from their activities are highest.
Our argument, then, is not a claim about overinvestment.
102
Rather, our argument is that in a price-taking (non-strategic)
model, rational and self-interested states will invest in
knowledge production up to the point that the marginal benefits from a national-welfare perspective equal the marginal
costs, and that the left side of the equation includes both the
benefits that citizens of the state derive from the consumption
of knowledge goods as well as positive local production externalities. The larger these terms are relative to the marginal
global benefits, the less underinvestment we should expect to
see. In sum, when knowledge goods are more local than global—i.e., when consumption is concentrated geographically and
production generates positive externalities that depreciate
across space—then the underinvestment problem described
above is less of a problem.
3. An Extension of the Formal Economic Model
To illustrate how this richer understanding of knowledge
goods affects the underinvestment hypothesis, we continue
with the rudimentary formal model begun in Part I. As before,
x is the level of investment in the production of a particular
knowledge good; BA(x) is the benefit to consumers in SA from investment of x in the relevant good; Bglobal is the sum of all Bs for
all nation-states; and C(x) is the cost of investing x. Also, as before, the globally optimal level of investment is xglobal*; and xA* <
xglobal* when BA(x) < Bglobal(x).
The presence of positive local production externalities further complicates this story. Let PE(x) represent the production
externality from x level of investment. Assume that the production externality is captured entirely by the country that makes
the investment. For instance, diabetes research might benefit
all diabetes patients, but diabetes research in Israel might confer an additional advantage on Israeli biotech firms who benefit
from access to the talent pool of diabetes researchers attracted
to Israel as a result of the investment. Once positive local production externalities enter the picture, the solution to SA’s optimization problem changes. Now, SA sets xA* such that BA′(xA*)

102. Strategic interactions complicated this model: states may try to commit to underinvestment so as to induce other states to invest more. See infra
notes 226–30 and accompanying text.
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+ PE′(xA*) = C′(xA*). As long as PE′(x) > 0, the addition of this
term pushes xA* upward.
This formalization allows us to make more precise claims
about underinvestment. First, underinvestment becomes less
severe as BA(x)/Bglobal(x) approaches 1, meaning that the
knowledge good is closer to a local public good than a global
one. (When BA(x)/Bglobal(x) = 1, the good is a pure cranberry good
and the underinvestment problem goes away.) Second, underinvestment becomes less severe when PE′(x) is large relative to
other terms in SA’s calculus. Another way to say this is that
presence of positive local production externalities makes investment in the provision of knowledge goods more attractive
from a national perspective. The underinvestment hypothesis
appears most plausible when knowledge goods are global public
goods and states are rational actors seeking to maximize absolute gains. As we discuss below, however, the underinvestment
hypothesis does not get us the whole way to a justification for
the international IP regime, because IP is not the only way for
consumer nation-states to compensate producer states. We pick
up the question of institutional design in Part IV and discuss
alternative institutional structures that might support cooperative outcomes. Before that, though, we interrogate the assumption that states are rational actors whose motive is to maximize
the welfare of their own citizens.
B. WHAT MOTIVATES NATION-STATES?
Our predictions so far have been based on the assumption
that states are rational actors that seek to maximize the absolute welfare of their citizens. In the international relations literature, this assumption is associated with the theory of insti103
tutionalism (also known as “regime theory”). According to
institutionalism, states are “rational egoists” that (at least
sometimes) see each other as potential partners in mutually
104
beneficial cooperative endeavors. Institutions such as inter103. See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 494 tbl.1
(1988); Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT’L ORG. 299, 318 (1982) (noting that regime theory sees
states as “actors [who] focus on their own returns and compare different outcomes with an eye to maximizing their own gains” as distinguished from the
“alternative conception” of states as “actors [who] seek to maximize the difference between their own returns and those of others”).
104. Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory, 20 INT’L SECURITY 39, 39 (1995).
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national agreements and organizations play a key role in this
105
story. For institutionalists, the challenge of global public good
production is largely a problem of institutional design, and arrangements with incentive-compatible features can yield coop106
erative outcomes.
The institutionalist perspective thus maps nicely onto the
economic account presented thus far of IP treaties as solving
the uncompensated-externalities underinvestment problem.
But the international political economy literature has presented other accounts of how nation-states are motivated. In this
Section, we examine three leading alternative accounts—
grounded in national security concerns, international norms,
and domestic politics—and their implications for investment in
knowledge goods.
1. National Security
Until recently, the “dominant theory” of international rela107
tions was not institutionalism—it was realism, which “paints
108
a rather grim picture of world politics.” Like institutionalists,
realists assume that nation-states are rational actors, but realists believe that states are focused on relative rather than abso109
lute gains. This is because “[s]tates are potentially dangerous
to each other,” are unsure of each other’s intentions, and
want—more than anything else—to maintain their own sover110
eignty.
Based on these assumptions, realists predict that states
will “aim to maximize their relative power position over other
states”—or, at the very least, to “maintain[] the existing bal-

105. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
CORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 244 (1984).

COOPERATION AND DIS-

106. See Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 766–68 (2001).
107. See MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE 41 (1997); see also
Thomas C. Walker & Jeffrey S. Morton, Re-Assessing the “Power of Power Politics” Thesis: Is Realism Still Dominant?, 7 INT’L STUD. REV. 341 (2005) (documenting decline in proportion of articles in international relations journals
adopting a realist perspective).
108. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions,
19 INT’L SECURITY 5, 9 (1994).
109. Id. at 12.
110. Id. at 10. More precisely, realists break these beliefs into five assumptions about the international system. Id. Different scholars frame these assumptions slightly differently, e.g., Grieco, supra note 103, at 488, but these
differences are not significant here.
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111

ance of power.” In measuring “power,” realists look not only
to a state’s military strength, but also to its supply of scientific
112
and technological talent. Thus, realists predict that states
will invest in science education and research in order to maintain power parity with (or gain a relative advantage over) po113
tential rivals.
The “Space Race” between the United States and Soviet
Union in the second half of the twentieth century is—at least
114
arguably —an illustration of realist predictions proving to be
correct. The successful launch of the first artificial satellite,
Sputnik, by the Soviet Union in 1957 (combined with the initial
115
failures of the United States’ Vanguard satellite program)
shattered the American public’s post-World War II sense of se116
curity. The same rockets that put a satellite in orbit could,
hypothetically, carry a nuclear warhead onto American soil.
Perhaps more frighteningly, Sputnik seemed to be the tangible
confirmation of reports from the mid-1950s that the Soviet Union was producing two to three times the number of scientists
117
and engineers as the United States. The national security
111. Mearsheimer, supra note 108, at 11 & n.27; see also Grieco, supra note
103, at 498 (“[R]ealists find that . . . the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.”).
112. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, FRANCE IN THE AGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC
STATE 15 (1968) (“[S]cientific research has become a primary determinant of
national power . . . .”); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER
POLITICS 56 (2001) (noting that scientific achievements are an indicator of “latent capabilities” that a state can convert into military power).
113. See, e.g., GILPIN, supra note 112 (“[T]he three goals of French foreign
policy [in the 1960s]—the continued military deterrence of the Soviet Union,
the economic and political containment of the United States, and the establishment of French primacy in western Europe—are greatly dependent on the
state of French science and technology. For this reason . . . the advancement of
scientific research has become a dominant concern of the leadership of contemporary France.”); Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science, Technology and Military
Policy, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 443, 445 (Ina Spiegel-Rösing et al. eds., 1977) (“Governments have
long acted as patrons of science in the hope of gaining improvements in the
instruments and techniques of war; what is new in our time is the scale of the
patronage offered and the impact which science has had on warfare.”).
114. But see Rodger A. Payne, Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower’s Response to Sputnik, 21 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 89 (1994) (questioning the realist account).
115. See Roger Launius, Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age, NASA,
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
116. See PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY 4 (2001).
117. See David Kaiser, The Physics of Spin: Sputnik Politics and American
Physicists in the 1950s, 73 SOC. RES. 1225, 1227 (2006).
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implications of this technological gap prompted the United
States to quickly make scientific education and space-related
technologies national priorities. Within two years of Sputnik’s
launch, Congress increased funding for the National Science
118
Foundation from $40 million to $140 million, created NASA
119
to coordinate and fund the space program, and launched the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (now DARPA) within the
120
Department of Defense. After years of reluctance to provide
federal assistance to education, Congress passed the National
Defense Education Act in 1958 to increase the number of stu121
dents in science at advanced levels. Maintaining an edge in
scientific talent began to be seen as essential to the long-term
122
security of the United States. And those national security
concerns catalyzed public spending on R&D, setting the stage
for countless future scientific advances (not the least of which
was “ARPANET,” the technological foundation of today’s Inter123
net).
The realist perspective on public R&D spending starkly
contrasts with the free-rider narrative. If the free-rider account
is correct, then we would expect Country A’s spending on R&D
to decrease as Country B’s R&D spending increases (i.e., Coun118. National Science Foundation Budget, 127 SCIENCE 510 (1958).
119. See Launius, supra note 115.
120. See Duncan Graham-Rowe, Fifty Years of DARPA: A Surprising History, NEW SCIENTIST (May 15, 2008), https://www.newscientist.com/article/
dn13908-fifty-years-of-darpa-a-surprising-history.
121. See BARBARA BARKSDALE CLOWSE, BRAINPOWER FOR THE COLD WAR:
THE SPUTNIK CRISIS AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT OF 1958 at
4 (1981).
122. See Donald A. Quarles, Cultivating Our Science Talent—Key to LongTerm Security, 80 SCI. MONTHLY 352 (1955); see also ISAACSON, supra note 92,
at 72 (“War mobilizes science . . . and this was especially true in the midtwentieth century. Many of the paramount technological feats of that era—
computers, atomic power, radar, and the Internet—were spawned by the military.”).
123. See Sharon Weinberger, Still in the Lead?, 451 NATURE 390 (2008).
The expressed desire to maintain comparative technological superiority did
not die with the fall of the Soviet Union. For example, news that China is
poised to surpass the United States in research and development spending by
2022 was greeted not with joy that there will be more knowledge production
for us to free-ride on, but with concern about the need to preserve “American
superiority.” Jacqueline Klimas, Lawmakers Worry China Will Top U.S. in
Scientific Research, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/27/lawmakers-worry-china-will-top-us
-scientific-resea. One congressman was quoted as saying, “I wish we could be
investing even more, especially as other nations are rising to challenge our
pre-eminence.” Id. (quoting Representative Adam B. Schiff).
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try A would stand aside as Country B plows ahead). The realist
perspective yields quite a different prediction: insofar as Country A and Country B are potential military rivals, Country A’s
spending on R&D will increase with Country B’s. Rather than
free-riding off Country A’s expenditures, Country B will bolster
its R&D efforts in an attempt to keep pace. Moreover, while the
free-rider narrative predicts that aggregate public spending on
R&D will fall below the global social optimum, realism suggests
the possibility of the opposite result. One country’s efforts to
boost its own scientific and technological capabilities—and thus
124
its security—may decrease the security of others. In this way,
a lack of coordination among countries with respect to R&D
spending may result in each country investing more than the
globally optimal amount in certain areas of science and technology.
One might question whether the realist account has any
explanatory power beyond the limited domain of defense and
defense-related technology. Moreover, while the realist account
might suggest the possibility of overinvestment (at least in
some areas), it might also lead us to expect to see
“undersharing” (i.e., states focused on relative gains will keep
their scientific and technological advances secret from potential
125
rivals). In practice, though, even research for which the pri126
mary results are not shared can lead to significant spillovers.
Furthermore, we observe defense research agencies investigating a wide array of topics and publicizing their results on sub127
128
jects ranging from concussion prevention to climate change

124. Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD
POL. 167, 170 (1978).
125. For example, U.S. patents can be kept secret when the government
determines that publication would be a national security threat. 35 U.S.C.
§ 181 (2012); see, e.g., G.W. Schulz, Government Secrecy Orders on Patents
Have Stifled More than 5,000 Inventions, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www
.wired.com/2013/04/gov-secrecy-orders-on-patents.
126. For example, the space race led to developments ranging from satellite
television to carbon monoxide detectors. Rob Mead, 10 Tech Breakthroughs To
Thank the Space Race for, TECHRADAR (July 20, 2009), http://www.techradar
.com/us/news/world-of-tech/10-tech-breakthroughs-to-thank-the-space-race-for
-617847.
127. Kris Osborn, NFL-Army Collaborative Research on Concussions Yields
Initial Results, SCOUT (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/
story/1613090-army-nfl-test-high-tech-helmets-for-safety.
128. Kris Osborn, Navy Researchers Are Analyzing Findings from Drones
Beneath Arctic Ice, SCOUT (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.scout.com/military/
warrior/story/1618090-navy-drones-patrol-beneath-arctic-ice.
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129

to the treatment of infectious diseases. To be sure, some of
this research may be driven by motives unrelated to national
security; the fact that it is carried out by a defense research
agency could be bureaucratic happenstance. However, we think
that a realist approach might offer some relevant insights.
For some scholars in the realist tradition, the perception of
130
power is as important as power itself. Capabilities are useful
to states in international politics not only because they can be
deployed in wartime, but because they can be used to deter or
influence other states in peacetime. A state that amasses scientific and technological capabilities may want to send signals to
other states clueing them into that fact. Yet for reasons that
are obvious, the United States might not want to invite a cadre
of Russian Air Force generals to inspect its latest fighter jet.
Instead, the United States wants Russia to know that the
United States has the capability to develop cutting-edge weaponry but does not want to share too many details of its technology with a potential rival.
One way to accomplish this objective is for the United
States to publicize the results of research showing that its scientists are top-rate. Ideally, the research would be relevant
enough to defense applications that it would lead Russia to
raise its estimate of U.S. military capabilities—but not so closely related to defense applications that publicizing the results
would amount to giving away the store. The research need not
be conducted by the U.S. military itself as long as the results
lead Russia to elevate its estimate of the quality of scientists
that the U.S. military might have at its disposal. Of course, if
the research product also yields benefits for U.S. consumers,
then all the better. But the selection of research projects for
signaling purposes does not necessarily follow the marginal
cost/marginal benefit calculus discussed above.
We cannot say how much government-sponsored research
is explained by our signaling story; we offer the signaling theory simply as a reason why security-focused states might invest
in science and technology. The signaling account is probably

129. See, e.g., DEFENCE SCI. & TECH. LAB., LICENSING OPPORTUNITY:
GAMMA-GLUTAMYL TRANSPEPTIDASE ATTENUATED FRANCISELLA (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
399418/Gamma-glutamyl_transpeptidase_attenuated_Francisella_Easy_
Access_IP_factsheet.pdf.
130. See William C. Wohlforth, The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre1914 Balance, 39 WORLD POL. 353, 353–54 (1987).
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most plausible with respect to military powers (e.g., the United
States and Russia) that are keenly concerned about the way
that other states perceive their capabilities; it is a less plausi131
ble explanation for public R&D spending in, say, Switzerland.
For present purposes, our point is only that some nation-states
may finance the production of knowledge goods even in circumstances where the conventional account might suggest that
they would not (i.e., where the marginal benefit to domestic
consumers is less than the marginal cost).
2. Norms
A more recent rival to realism and institutionalism is “con132
structivism.” Unlike realists and institutionalists, who start
from fixed assumptions about state interests, constructivists
seek to “open[] up . . . the black box of interest and identity
formation”; their central claim is that state interests emerge
from their interactions with other states and international in133
stitutions. The difference between realists and institutionalists, on the one side, and constructivists, on the other, is
sometimes described as the difference between a “logic of con134
sequences” and a “logic of appropriateness.” Whereas realists
and institutionalists assume that states act strategically in order to achieve their individual goals, constructivists argue that
interstate interactions help to determine what goals each state
135
Phrased differently, constructivists believe that
pursues.
131. Note, though, that Japan—whose constitution outlaws war as a means
of settling interstate disputes—may gain substantial security benefits from
the perception that its scientists could, if pressed, develop offensive nuclear
capabilities very quickly. Cf. Jeffrey Lewis, If Japan Wanted to Build a Nuclear Bomb It’d Be Awesome at It, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 26, 2014), http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be
-awesome-at-it (discussing Japan’s potential nuclear capabilities).
132. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 324, 324–25 (1998); John Gerard Ruggie, What
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 856 (1998).
133. Checkel, supra note 132, at 326.
134. See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 949–52 (1998).
135. See, e.g., id. at 949; see also Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 965 (2000)
(reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
(1999)) (“[Constructivists] argue that international norms help constitute the
identity of actors on the international stage (such as nations and rulers) and
help shape their interests. In this way, national behaviors are significantly
influenced by international norms in ways that do not reduce to an instrumen-
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states, “through their social interaction in accordance with the
characteristic rules and processes of [the international] system,
learn from and confirm to each other what it means to be a
136
state.” And as states update their understanding of what the
international system expects from them, they conform their behavior to the prevailing logic of appropriateness.
All of this might sound highly abstract, but a concrete example may help to illustrate. Martha Finnemore observes that
through the mid-1960s, “poverty alleviation” was not “an explicitly articulated and internationalized goal of states and
multilateral governmental agencies”; rather, development efforts by states and international organizations focused primari137
ly on growth. Finnemore further argues that the World Bank,
under the leadership of Robert McNamara, played a pivotal
role in convincing states in the late 1960s and 1970s to redirect
their development efforts from the goal of growth to the goal of
138
poverty alleviation. That is, McNamara and the World Bank
triggered a “normative shift” resulting in a widespread belief
that poverty alleviation was something “that states were sup139
posed to do.” McNamara and the World Bank succeeded in altering the logic of appropriateness, such that states now believe
that the international community expects them to make pov140
erty reduction a policy priority. Constructivist scholars have
pointed to other “normative shifts”—on matters ranging from
slavery to the killing of whales and elephants—that appear to
141
be the result of similar dynamics.
Just as realism directs our attention to security concerns
and institutionalism directs our attention to the design features of international organizations and agreements, constructivism directs our attention to the norms that guide state behavior. On the constructivist view, states will invest in
knowledge production if they come to perceive science as something states are supposed to do. Similarly, a state’s choice between IP and non-IP mechanisms will depend not only on the
tal calculus.”).
136. David Armstrong, Globalization and the Social State, 24 REV. INT’L
STUD. 461, 468 (1998) (emphasis added).
137. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 96–97 (1996).
138. Id. at 103–27.
139. Id. at 90.
140. Id. at 125.
141. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of
Norms in International Society, 44 INT’L ORG. 479 (1990).

2016] KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND NATION-STATES

209

perceived costs and benefits of those tools, but also on the perceived appropriateness of each approach.
Constructivism helps to explain the widespread creation of
science policy organizations by developing countries in the
third quarter of the twentieth century. Starting in the 1950s,
officials of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) began to encourage member
states to set up their own science bureaucracies and to invest in
142
R&D domestically. A UN report at the dawn of the next decade declared that “[s]tates should make it their business” to
143
promote scientific research within their own borders. In 1967,
a UNESCO statement of principles proclaimed that “[t]he development of science policy should be the responsibility of an
organization at the highest level of government” in each coun144
try. These and similar statements reflected an emerging international norm: scientific research, according to UNESCO officials, was something states ought to do, even if a rationalchoice calculus would suggest that free-riding was the optimal
strategy.
Martha Finnemore has shown how an emerging logic of
appropriateness led small developing countries—including
Lebanon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia—to
establish national science organizations by the end of the
145
1960s, with a view to promoting domestic R&D. These efforts
are difficult to explain from the perspective of rational institutionalism. As Finnemore notes, these nations may have been
materially better off if they had followed a free-riding strate146
gy. Realism is no more helpful; there is no apparent reason to
believe that developing countries achieved any security benefits
as a result of their R&D investments. Finnemore’s case studies
suggest that at least some public R&D spending is best understood as a reflection of prevailing international norms, not as a
147
consequence of economic or security considerations.

142. Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of
Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization
and Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG. 565, 576 (1993).
143. PIERRE AUGER, UNESCO, CURRENT TRENDS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
220 (1961).
144. UNESCO, Principles and Problems of National Science Policy, in 5
SCI. POL’Y STUD. & DOCUMENTS SERIES 87, 87 (1967).
145. Finnemore, supra note 142, at 587–91.
146. Id. at 583.
147. Id. at 592.
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This norms-based account might be reframed as a prestigebased account: investments in the production of knowledge
goods (and, in particular, investments that yield successful results) raise a nation-state’s standing in the international community. The pursuit of prestige—like the quest for security in
the realist account—may be a zero-sum game: if prestige is relative, then one nation-state’s investment in increasing its own
148
prestige may decrease the utility of other states. Alternatively, prestige may serve as a substitute for cash transfers from
consumer nation-states to producer nation-states. For example,
if the U.S. National Institutes for Health (NIH) develops a successful Ebola vaccine and gives it away to patients in West African countries at zero cost, the United States may be partially
149
compensated for its efforts through prestige gains. A fullfledged prestige-based account would require a more careful
specification of the particular benefits that prestige brings as
well as the reasons why nation-states pursue those benefits.
While we do not develop such an account here, we note the possibility that elements of the constructivist account may be
translatable into a rational-actor model in which TBA (the
transfer from the consumer state to the producer state) takes a
nonmonetary form.
To be sure, nothing in constructivist theory suggests that
international norms will always lead countries to invest more
in R&D. Norms can push nations in the opposite direction—for
example, leading states not to invest in research related to ge150
netically modified organisms (GMOs). The key point is that
constructivist theory, like realism, may aid in explaining why
patterns of public R&D spending diverge from the free-rider account’s predictions. Constructivism cannot, however, tell us the
direction or magnitude of that divergence in all cases.

148. See Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern of International
Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 701, 704 (1991).
149. For a discussion of NIH efforts to find an Ebola vaccine, see Thomas
M. Burton, NIH Expands Testing of Ebola Drugs and Vaccines into New Countries, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nih-expands
-ebola-research-into-new-countries-in-search-for-vaccine-1435093932.
150. See Robert Falkner, The Political Economy of ‘Normative Power’ Europe: EU Environmental Leadership in International Biotechnology Regulation, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 507 (2007) (discussing the spread of Europe’s morerestrictive GMO regulatory regime through European “normative” leadership).
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3. Domestic Politics
A fourth perspective, known in the international relations
literature as “liberalism” or “liberal intergovernmentalism,”
shares key features of the other three approaches but focuses
151
attention on actors “above and below the nation-state.” Like
realism and institutionalism, liberalism sees behavior on the
international stage as the product of instrumentally rational
152
And like constructivism, liberalism opens up the
action.
“black box” of state interests. A foundational assumption of liberal international relations theory is that “[t]he fundamental
actors in international politics are individuals and private
groups, who are on the average rational” and who use state in153
stitutions to pursue their goals. On this view, state action reflects the preferences of a subset of domestic society that has
154
prevailed in political competition. Liberals do not deny that
the balance of power and the configuration of international institutions affect outcomes, but they posit that these variables
have only a secondary influence. Liberals argue that “what
states want is the primary determinant of what they do”—and
“what states want” is primarily a function of who has won out
155
in domestic political competition.
The liberal perspective thus focuses our attention on interest groups at the domestic level who compete to influence national policy. Liberalism predicts that states will invest in science if—and only if—the beneficiaries of such investment have
sufficient pull among policymakers domestically. Similarly, the
selection of IP vs. non-IP tools will reflect interest-group politics. That is, state investment in knowledge production may
have little to do with relative power (realism), absolute gains
(institutionalism), or prevailing norms (constructivism), but
will have much to do with the prevailing political alignment inside the state.
An optimistic version of the liberal account might posit
that, at least in democratic countries, leaders will be responsive
to public opinion and that the public generally supports domestic R&D spending. In the United States, for instance, a Pew
151. See generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997) (discussing liberalism as a theory of international politics).
152. Id. at 516–20.
153. Id. at 516–20 (emphasis omitted).
154. Id. at 518.
155. Id. at 521.
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survey in 2013 found that even when faced with a possible
budget sequester, seventy-seven percent of the public wanted to
maintain or increase research funding, while only twenty per156
cent favored cuts. A poll the following year found that seventy-one percent of U.S. adults believed that government investment in basic scientific research would “pay off in the long
157
run.” Surveys in the United Kingdom and Japan find similar
158
support for government spending on scientific research. Perhaps these poll numbers reflect the fact that voters are conducting their own cost-benefit calculus and concluding that investment in R&D is a welfare-improving use of public
resources. But given how difficult it is for even the most highly
skilled economist to calculate the optimal level of public investment in R&D, a more plausible conclusion is that most voters support science spending based on a rough guess that benefits exceed costs rather than a rigorous cost-benefit evaluation.
A more pessimistic version of the liberal account, influenced by public choice theory rather than a faith in democratic
processes, might lead us to consider whether some share of
public R&D spending reflects rent-seeking activities by beneficiaries of such expenditures. Indeed, the same public-goods logic underlying the free-rider narrative suggests that wellorganized interest groups will successfully extract wealth
transfers from the state. Protection of the public fisc is itself a
public good, as all taxpayers stand to benefit from the prudent
allocation of government resources. In the political struggle between concentrated subsidy-seeking industry groups on the one
hand and diffuse taxpayers on the other, we anticipate that
free-riding behavior will be more rampant on the latter side,
159
tilting the competitive balance in favor of the former. At least
156. As Sequester Deadline Looms, Little Support for Cutting Most Programs, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/
02/22/as-sequester-deadline-looms-little-support-for-cutting-most-programs.
157. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS, POLITICS AND SCIENCE ISSUES
76 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/07/2015-07-01_science-and
-politics_FINAL-1.pdf.
158. See 1 NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2002, at
7–15 (2002) (noting that agreement with the statement “[e]ven if it brings no
immediate benefits, scientific research that advances the frontiers of
knowledge is necessary and should be supported by the Federal Government”
has “consistently been in the 80-percent range” in the United States, and was
seventy-two percent in the United Kingdom in 2000 and eighty percent in Japan in 1995 (citations omitted)).
159. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
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some amount of public support for R&D may be attributed to
160
this imbalance.
Not all rents will take the form of direct subsidies to interest groups. For example, IP protection may serve as an indirect
way of transferring rents to producers of knowledge goods—
with the aforementioned advantage that IP does not require
161
politicians to raise taxes. Many accounts of the political economy of copyright lawmaking seem to fit within this more pessimistic vision of liberalism, with industry rent-seekers leading
162
to over-protection, raising questions about the validity of the
underinvestment hypothesis for many creative works.
Rent extraction through R&D support also may be a way of
skirting international trade law limits on production subsi163
dies. For instance, instead of an outright subsidy to aircraft
164
the
manufacturers (which might trigger WTO sanctions),
U.S. federal government might sponsor research on jet propulsion with potential applications for U.S. companies. To be sure,
the indirect subsidy might not have its intended effect if foreign
aircraft manufacturers can make use of the research findings
just as easily as U.S. manufacturers can. Yet if U.S. firms—due
to their proximity to the scientists carrying on the research—
are better able to operationalize the results, then government
support for the project might function much like a production
165
subsidy while differing in name.
160. See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of
Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 363–64 (2006) (noting
that the “principal recipients” of the research credit under 26 U.S.C. § 41
(2012) are “large U.S. manufacturing corporations” who are “more than willing
to invest in lobbying activities and campaign donations to ensure continuance
of this large tax savings”).
161. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126
HARV. L. REV. 740, 740 (2013) (“Complaints have been legion that copyright
industry groups and corporate copyright owners have sought and too often obtained extremely strong and overly long copyright protections that interfere
with downstream creative endeavors and legitimate consumer expectations.”).
163. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
in 2 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 83 (P. Macrory, A. Appleton & M. Plummer eds., 2005) (discussing
subsidy interaction with international trade laws).
164. See, e.g., EU Launches New Trade Dispute with US over Boeing Subsidies: WTO, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp
-eu-launches-new-trade-dispute-with-us-over-boeing-subsidies-wto-2014-12.
165. Why might U.S. firms have an advantage in operationalizing the results? Presumably the results would be published in English, and the scientists might be willing to meet with counterparts from U.S. firms. Moreover,
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As with constructivism, the liberal perspective does not
necessarily lead us to reject the underinvestment hypothesis.
Just as beneficiaries of public support for R&D may lobby intensively for increasing expenditures, other constituencies (e.g.,
deficit hawks and tax-cut advocates) may push politicians in
the opposite direction. But the liberal perspective does suggest
that the process of determining domestic R&D spending levels
is more complicated than the standard stories of free-riding and
uncompensated externalities suggest. Even where free-riding
would appear to be the optimal strategy from a national welfare perspective, corporate and other interest groups may convince politicians to devote additional resources to domestic
R&D. By the same token, even where the internalized benefits
of R&D investment would appear to exceed the budgetary costs,
domestic politics may stand in the way of spending hikes.
What does all this mean for the conventional economic account of international coordination as a solution to the underinvestment problem? The short answer is that we cannot be
certain; the underinvestment hypothesis is empirically unverifiable but intuitively plausible, at least with respect to
knowledge goods of the global-public-good variety. While we
expect that nation-states will be influenced by a variety of factors not captured in our rudimentary economic model, we have
no strong reason to believe that these other factors will systematically favor underinvestment or overinvestment. Another way
to say this is that for knowledge goods of the global-public-good
type, the underinvestment hypothesis may yield an accurate
but noisy estimate of state behavior; while we expect that behavior will diverge from the hypothesis’s predictions in countless cases, we have no strong reason to expect systematic divergence in one direction or the other.
III. DOMESTIC DIVERSITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL IP
LAW
Under the “harmonization hypothesis” presented in Part I,
agreements such as TRIPS dictate how nation-states subsidize
and allocate knowledge goods at the domestic level, leading to
“too much” IP and “too little” support for non-IP mechanisms.
As we explain here, however, the existence of a global IP re-

U.S. firms might be able to hire the scientists themselves after the project is
complete, making the transfer of knowledge from government to domestic industry even more seamless.

2016] KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND NATION-STATES

215

gime does not require any individual nation-state to rely on IP
as a mechanism for incentivizing innovation or allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic level. At first glance,
this claim may seem surprising. After all, if a country signs a
global IP treaty such as TRIPS, doesn’t that obligate the country to provide protection for IP domestically? To a limited extent, the answer is yes: a TRIPS signatory must establish copyright and patent systems that meet minimum standards and
treat citizens of other signatories at least as favorably as its
166
own citizens. Yet, as we explain in the following two sections,
TRIPS still leaves individual nations substantial leeway to
adopt alternative arrangements for both the provision and allocation of knowledge goods within their own borders.
A. THE SEPARABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
INCENTIVES
International IP treaties require nation-states to offer minimum levels of IP protection for knowledge production, which
ensures that foreign consumers bear some of the cost of domestic innovation through the higher prices they pay on IPprotected goods. This appears to create an asymmetry between
IP and non-IP incentives, in that foreign consumers need not
contribute to non-IP subsidies for knowledge production, even
when they reap substantial benefits. But the existence of international IP treaties means that nation-states can in fact seek
compensation from foreign consumers. That is, the international IP system allows states to internalize some of the benefits of
knowledge produced through public finance mechanisms.
Most directly, recipients of knowledge-production subsidies
such as prizes, grants, and tax credits could be required to assign all IP rights to the state, which could enforce those rights
abroad. Thus, the fact that a country has signed onto a global
IP treaty doesn’t mean that the country must use IP to incentivize information production at the domestic level. Rather, a
country that signs onto a global IP treaty acquires the option to
seek compensation from foreign users of domestically produced
knowledge goods, while retaining the freedom to choose whatever innovation-incentive mechanism it pleases at the domestic
167
level.

166. Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www
.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
167. Commentators advocating for opt-in medical prize schemes have noted
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This possibility is not purely hypothetical. U.S. federal
agencies that develop knowledge goods in-house often retain IP
rights to their inventions and then license those inventions in168
ternationally (as well as domestically). But a state need not
assert foreign IP rights itself to obtain compensation from
abroad; it could also allow the innovator to assert these rights
and then collect a share of the profits through taxation. The
U.S. federal government offers a tax credit equal to twenty percent of research expenses above a “base amount” (the base
amount is calculated on the basis of the taxpayer’s historical
169
research expenditures), but the federal government effectively reclaims a portion of the returns to R&D when it imposes a
tax on corporate and individual income.
Recipients of federal research grants in the United States
are also able to patent inventions resulting from that research
under the Bayh-Dole Act and license them for domestic manufacture (a regime that has been replicated in many other coun170
tries). Then, when foreign consumers purchase goods and
that these systems are clearly TRIPS compliant. HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note
61, at 106; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III & TALHA SYED, INFECTION: THE
HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT
IT (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript ch. 5, at 37), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
people/tfisher/Infection_Prizes.pdf. Opt-in prize systems need not be implemented on a global scale: an individual country can offer a prize for relinquishment of domestic IP rights while still enforcing IP rights abroad.
168. In 2014, the National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, and Food and Drug Administration brought in over $137 million in patent royalties. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, OTT STATISTICS, http://www
.ott.nih.gov/ott-statistics (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). The Departments of Energy and Defense are active patenters as well. PAUL W. HEISEY ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GOVERNMENT PATENTING AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 16 (2006), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/471043/
err15_1_.pdf. The phenomenon is not limited to the United States: the governments of France, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India have all
amassed patent portfolios (including, in some cases, acquiring patent rights
from abroad). HOSUK LEE-MAKIYAMA & PATRICK MESSERLIN, EUR. CTR. FOR
INT’L POLITICAL ECON., SOVEREIGN PATENT FUNDS (SPFS): NEXT-GENERATION
TRADE DEFENCE? 3–4 (2014), http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/PB06.pdf.
169. 26 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
170. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2012); David C. Mowery & Bhaven N.
Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University–Industry Technology
Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
EDWIN MANSFIELD 233, 241 (Albert N. Link & F. M. Scherer eds., 2005); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from
the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIO. 2078 (2008) (suggesting safeguards to apply in
developing countries). For examples of domestic-industry provisions in the
equivalent of Bayh-Dole in other countries, see Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Scientific and Technological Progress (promulgated by the Standing
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services protected by that IP, the IP “shadow tax” is transferred
back to the domestic manufacturer and from the manufacturer
171
to the U.S. patentee. One might ask whether the federal government is really “reclaiming” any of the payment from foreign
consumers if the payment flows to a tax-exempt private research institution, such as Stanford or the University of Chicago. In at least one sense, the answer is “yes”: the tax exemption
for private universities is a “tax expenditure”—economically lit172
tle different from any other appropriation —so the federal
government is effectively claiming a share of the foreign benefits and then giving that share back to the patenting universities.
(To be sure, there are good reasons why the United States
does not set its tax rate at one hundred percent.) In virtually
every case, the flow of royalties from a foreign consumer to a
U.S. patentee can be redescribed as (1) a payment from the foreign consumer to the U.S. government; and (2) a decision by the
U.S. government as to what percentage of the royalties should
flow through to the U.S. patentee. The international IP regime
sets a framework for setting the size of the payment at step one
but allows the producer state substantial autonomy at step
173
two.
One might question whether, as a practical matter, nationstates in fact have the capacity to tax IP income earned by domestic innovators from foreign sales. The slow progress of the
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 2, 1993, rev’d Dec. 29, 2007, effective July 1,
2008), art. 21, 2007 ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT NO. 82; Intellectual Property
Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act 51 of 2008 § 11
(S. Afr.).
171. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
172. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (providing tax exemptions for educational and scientific organizations, among others); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES vii (1973) (comparing tax incentives and direct government expenditures).
173. See TRIPS, supra note 14. In this respect, our analysis suggests a
counterargument to Benjamin Roin’s claim that intellectual property “limits
[the government’s] ability to expropriate socially valuable innovations.” Roin,
supra note 9, at 1071. In Roin’s view, IP laws allow a state to make a credible
commitment to innovators that the state will allow them to reap the rewards
from their own knowledge production efforts. Yet nothing in IP law limits the
tax rate that a state can impose on patent rents earned by its own citizens. It
may be the case that as a practical matter, states that grant IP protection to
knowledge goods generated by their own citizens are unlikely to negate the
benefits of IP protection through tax laws. But any such limits on the taxation
of patent rents arise from domestic political economy and domestic (non-IP)
law, not from the international IP regime.
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Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, undertaken
jointly by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G20, might not inspire confidence
174
on this score. Our argument is not that nation-states are unconstrained in their ability to tax; in many cases, however, the
principal constraint on the taxation of international IP income
is political, not legal or technological. This is especially true
with respect to the United States: as one of us has argued, the
President and his Treasury Secretary already have the statutory authority to bring an end to strategies used by corporations
such as Apple and Google to defer U.S. taxes on income from
175
overseas sales. And even if a nation-state is limited in its capacity to tax overseas income earned by domestic firms, it still
has the option of making government prizes and grants conditional on the recipient relinquishing IP rights to a sovereign
fund.
More fundamentally, if a state seeks to maximize the welfare of its citizens, it doesn’t matter whether the government
can capture the benefits to foreign consumers as long as someone within the state does. If a federal grant to Stanford leads to
a cure for lung cancer, and Stanford patents it worldwide and
licenses it to Merck, then foreign consumers who benefit from
the drug must pay a patent “tax” to U.S. entities: Stanford and
Merck. Even if the federal government chooses not to reclaim
any of those patent rents (e.g., if the federal government exempts Stanford from paying income taxes), the benefit to foreign consumers is still internalized within the United States. A
state seeking to maximize the welfare of its citizens would consider that benefit when choosing how much grant funding for
lung cancer to award in the first place. Or, in the language of
our model, the federal government would consider something
closer to Bglobal(x) than BUS(x) when setting its level of investment x for a lung cancer-related knowledge good, which may
push x closer to the global optimum.
174. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 6 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=2716125 (concluding that BEPS is an “inadequate” response to global
tax avoidance because it continues to rely on taxing active income at the
source and passive income at residence, rather than the other way around).
175. See Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power To Tax, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 21–24), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=
2773329 (arguing that the President and his Treasury Secretary have the
statutory authority to reclassify so-called “hybrid branches” as per se corporations).
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Our argument has a potential application to the ongoing
policy debate at the domestic level in the United States regarding the Bayh-Dole Act, and to debates over exporting Bayh176
Dole to other countries. Critics of Bayh-Dole argue that the
beneficiaries of public funding should be required—at least under many circumstances—to place their inventions in the pub177
lic domain. While we are sympathetic to arguments for greater use of non-IP mechanisms for incentivizing innovation and
allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic level, we
suggest (perhaps surprisingly) that Bayh-Dole may actually encourage the use of alternatives to IP. The Bayh-Dole Act allows
the United States to claim partial compensation from consumers in other countries who benefit from U.S.-funded research.
The federal government may claim some of these benefits itself
through taxation of U.S. manufacturers; in other cases, the
benefits flow to public universities and to private research institutions that the federal government has chosen to support
178
through tax exemptions. The important point is that patenting the results of federally funded research allows the United
States to internalize some of the positive externalities generat179
ed through non-IP investments in innovation. Insofar as the
relevant knowledge goods are global public goods and the United States is a rational, self-interested actor, we expect that the
possibility of internalization will lead the U.S. to invest more in
knowledge-good production through non-IP mechanisms. In
other words, IP protection at the international level and non-IP
innovation incentives at the domestic level may be complements, not substitutes.
To the extent this flexibility in domestic innovation policy
is desirable, our analysis highlights a potential benefit of BayhDole regimes that is generally overlooked. As a number of
176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and
the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at
289, 310. For a review of the controversy surrounding the Bayh-Dole Act and a
critique of existing justifications for many Bayh-Dole patents, see Ian Ayres &
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2748375.
178. In 2014, six of the top ten universities ranked by life sciences licensing
income were public universities. See Brady Huggett, Top US Universities, Institutes for Life Sciences in 2014, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1131, 1131
(2015).
179. This argument applies to prizes and tax incentives as well as grants,
which are generally used as complements to, not substitutes for, IP rights. See
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 316.
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scholars (including one of us) have pointed out, there are still
significant costs on the other side of the ledger, which may, on
180
net, warrant reform. But we think it is worth noting that the
common concern that allowing IP protection on publicly sup181
ported works requires U.S. taxpayers to “pay twice” overlooks
the point that not allowing IP protection permits non-U.S. consumers to avoid paying at all. When combined with international IP treaties, Bayh-Dole regimes may encourage states to
increase direct public funding for research, alleviating
Scotchmer’s concern that IP treaties at the international level
182
will cause “too little public sponsorship” at the domestic level.
All of this is not to say that TRIPS places zero limits on a
producer state’s innovation policy. To comply with TRIPS, a
state must undertake the administrative expense of maintaining an IP system, and it must conform its IP system to a set of
core rules. It may not, for instance, limit the term of copyrights
to less than the life of the author plus fifty years or the term of
patents to less than twenty years, nor may it refuse to offer patents on inventions that are plainly patentable subject matter.
Nonetheless, we think the constraints of TRIPS should not be
183
overstated. TRIPS still leaves countries free to use non-IP innovation incentives, and it still leaves states free to determine
the size of the rewards that will go to domestic producers of
knowledge goods.

180. See Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 177 (reviewing the scholarly consensus from works such as Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 177, that the only
compelling justification for Bayh-Dole patents is that they provide an incentive to commercialize some new technologies, and proposing a “market test” to
determine the least amount of exclusivity under which a licensee will commercialize).
181. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts
on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1194
(2000) (“The public winds up paying twice for such inventions, by both funding
them and paying supracompetitive prices to use them.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996) (arguing
that Bayh-Dole “seems to require the public to pay twice for the same invention”); Andrea Simon, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 428, 433 (1984) (arguing that government-commissioned artistic works should not be copyrightable
because they are supported by “tens of billions of tax dollars annually” and
“[c]opyright . . . forces the public to pay twice”).
182. Scotchmer, supra note 23.
183. Cf. Ouellette, supra note 59, at 121–24 (noting that TRIPS does allow
countries to experiment with opt-in non-IP incentive systems, but lamenting
the limits TRIPS places on experimentation with substantive patent law).
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B. THE SEPARABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
ALLOCATION
The international IP system also allows states substantial
flexibility in allocating knowledge goods at the domestic level.
Imagine a world with two countries—say, Japan and France—
that agree to provide IP protection for knowledge goods produced in the other country. If a Japanese firm receives a
French patent, France must enforce a prohibition on infringement of the patent within French borders. Yet France remains
free to decide that at the domestic level, the knowledge good
patented by the firm ought not be allocated via the price mechanism. For instance, France may contract with the Japanese
firm for an exclusive license within French borders. France
may then choose any mechanism it wishes to allocate access
domestically. It may, for example, auction off the exclusive license to domestic firms and allow the auction winner to control
access. Alternatively, it may adopt an open-access approach
whereby everyone in France can practice the invention free of
charge. The agreement between Japan and France requires only that France pay the firm a bilaterally negotiated price for access to the firm’s knowledge good or else enforce the firm’s patent. As long as the firm and France strike a deal, France may
choose from a wide menu of domestic allocative options.
This example is far from fanciful. As Benjamin Roin notes,
most developed countries use a similar mechanism to allocate
access to patented pharmaceuticals. After a firm obtains a patent on a pharmaceutical product, it generally agrees to sell the
product in other countries at a government-set price. Those
countries’ governments can choose for themselves how to allocate product access within their own borders (e.g., through a
single-payer system or through prescription drug insurance
184
with a copay). For example, the United Kingdom uses a system known as the Pharmaceutical Price Regulatory Scheme
(PPRS) to set prices for branded medicines; it then allocates access domestically through its taxpayer-funded National Health
185
Service. If patent holders are unsatisfied with the PPRS
price, they can choose to sell their products only on the private
market, for which U.K. citizens can buy private insurance or
184. Roin, supra note 9, at 1012–13.
185. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION
SCHEME 2014, at 9–10, 18–32, 41–56 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282523/Pharmaceutical_Price_
Regulation.pdf.
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186

pay out of pocket. For our purposes, the key point is that different countries can choose different domestic allocation mechanisms even while subscribing to the same global IP framework.
There is, however, a potential hurdle for states that seek to
allocate goods domestically through non-price mechanisms. In
our hypothetical above, France might not be willing to pay a fee
to the Japanese firm for a license to distribute the invention for
free domestically if it thinks that its citizens will then resell the
good to consumers in other countries. (We say “might not” rather than “will not”: French residents who resell the invention
to foreign consumers still benefit—albeit in the form of cash rather than from the invention itself.) And the Japanese firm, for
its part, might not be willing to sell a license to France if it
thinks that French citizens will then resell the good in other
markets and undercut the Japanese firm’s prices.
In practice, we see nation-states and patent holders going
to great lengths to make sure that knowledge goods distributed
at a discount in one country are not later resold elsewhere. One
striking example of this phenomenon comes from Egypt: Gilead
Sciences, a pharmaceutical company based in California, has
agreed to license the hepatitis C drug sofosbuvir to the Egyptian government, which then distributes the pills to its own cit187
izens for free. Gilead sells sofosbuvir under the brand name
188
Sovaldi in the United States for $1000 per one-a-day pill. To
prevent Egyptians from reselling sofosbuvir pills abroad and
undercutting Gilead’s price, Egypt requires that all pills be dispensed by government pharmacies, and that all patients must
hand in their last empty bottle in order to obtain a new bot189
tle. Moreover, as the New York Times reports, “[t]hose receiving new bottles must immediately unscrew the cap, break the
seal and take the first pill in front of the pharmacist — making
190
it nearly impossible to resell the bottle.” This example may be
an extreme case, but other countries that distribute knowledge

186. Thus, when negotiating with the National Health Service, a patentee
should not be willing to accept less in total profits than it could receive from
these alternatives. Id. at 16.
187. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Curing Hepatitis C, in an Experiment the Size of
Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/health/
hepatitis-c-treatment-egypt.html.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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goods to their own citizens on a non-price basis also take
measures to block resale. For example, Uruguay—which has
provided free laptops to hundreds of thousands of elementary
school students and teachers—uses a serial number tracking
system to tie laptops to individual students and requires that
recipients of free laptops sign a declaration swearing not to re191
sell the computers.
Significantly, patentees (and the nation-states that license
knowledge goods from patentees for domestic distribution) cannot necessarily rely on international IP law to restrict resale.
Under the doctrine known as international “first sale” or “exhaustion,” the first authorized sale (including a free distribution) of an IP-protected good in one country may exhaust IP
rights in that good, such that the rightsholder cannot limit re192
sale. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that international exhaustion applies
193
to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad, but the
en banc Federal Circuit has since decided that Kirtsaeng does
not change the current rule that foreign sales do not exhaust
194
U.S. patent rights. There is currently no international standard on IP exhaustion; rather, TRIPS explicitly states that
“nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of
195
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.” The absence of
an international no-exhaustion rule potentially limits (but does
not eliminate) the ability of nation-states to prevent the resale
of subsidized goods to consumers abroad.
***
The observations in this Section and the previous one can
be combined: the international IP system establishes a framework for setting the size of transfers between nation-states that
consume knowledge goods and nation-states that produce

191. ¿Cómo Acceder a la Compra de un Equipo Ceibal?, PLAN CEIBAL (Jan.
28, 2015) http://www.ceibal.edu.uy/art%C3%ADculo/preguntas-frecuentes/
compra/Como-acceder-a-la-compra-de-un-equipo-Ceibal.
192. Under U.S. law, “patentees cannot circumvent the application of patent exhaustion principles by distributing a product embodying the patent for
free.” LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
193. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013).
194. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 760
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). We examine this international patent exhaustion
issue in greater depth in a separate essay. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note
20.
195. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 6.
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knowledge goods, but it does not dictate how nation-states reward knowledge-good producers within their own borders, not
does it dictate how nation-states distribute knowledge goods to
their own citizens. A TRIPS signatory state may still choose
non-IP mechanisms both for incentivizing innovation and for
allocating access to knowledge goods at the domestic level. Regardless of what mechanisms it uses at the domestic level, a
knowledge-good-producing nation-state retains the option of using the international IP system to demand that other countries
share in the cost of producing global public goods, with the specifics of that cost-sharing to be determined via separate negotiations.
For example, the United States could—consistent with
TRIPS—establish a taxpayer-financed prize for the first inventor to patent a vaccine for the common cold, with the condition
that any inventor claiming the prize must surrender the patent
to the federal government. The federal government could then
make the vaccine available domestically for free while charging
for the right to practice the patent overseas. The U.S. and another country (say, the U.K.) could then strike a deal whereby
the U.K. pays an annual fee to the U.S. in exchange for the
right to distribute the vaccine within the U.K.’s borders. And
the U.K. could then distribute the vaccine to its own citizens for
free or at a discount. In this example, the U.S. does not use the
patent system to incentivize innovation at the domestic level,
and neither it nor the U.K. uses the price mechanism to allocate access.
Yet even in cases like the example above—where the producer state opts for a non-IP incentive mechanism and the consumer state chooses to allocate access on a basis other than
price—TRIPS remains relevant to the outcome. That is because
TRIPS sets a baseline for negotiations between producers and
consumers regarding cost-sharing. To continue with the formal
model from above (with SB still the consumer nation-state and
SA the producer), TRIPS sets a floor of PB|monopoly on the transfer
from SB to SA (TBA). The profit that SA can extract from SB if it
sells the relevant knowledge good at a monopoly price in SB
functions as a floor on TBA because SA will reject any lower offer from SB in licensing talks. (Note that SB almost certainly
could not ban trade in the relevant good without running afoul
196
of WTO rules.) At the same time, the doctrine of international

196. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1A, ¶ 1,
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exhaustion may make it difficult for SA to extract significantly
more than PB|monopoly from SB. If, for example, SA sought to demand a licensing fee from SB in excess of PB|monopoly, SB could seek
to acquire the relevant knowledge good on the secondary market and avoid transacting directly with SA.
To be sure, these conclusions come with caveats, and we
conclude this Part with three limits on TRIPS’s effectiveness at
setting TBA. First, this model is obviously inapplicable for the
many knowledge goods that nation-states are not required to
protect under TRIPS, ranging from hygiene checklists for in197
198
to results of failed research projects.
tensive-care units
TRIPS thus does little to require a state that benefits from these goods from compensating the state the produces them. Accordingly, if a producing state seeks to maximize the welfare of
its citizens, it has little incentive to consider foreign benefits
when setting its level of investment in goods for which the international IP system fails to enable appropriability. If there is
a global underinvestment problem, states may thus need to
199
turn to non-IP coordination mechanisms.
A second qualification is that, even for goods that are clearly protectable with IP, SB may decrease TBA by threatening to
exercise its rights to issue a compulsory license under Article
31 of TRIPS. That provision allows a signatory state to make
use of a patent without the holder’s authorization, although the
state still must provide “adequate remuneration” to the patent
holder, “taking into account the economic value of the authori-

Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (incorporating the provisions
of the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade); General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, § 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (“No prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges . . . shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other contracting party [unless a specific exception applies] . . . .”).
197. See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 41, at 1902–03.
198. See Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041,
2050–52 (2012).
199. For example, Nicholson Price has explained that the nascent field of
“black-box medicine”—complex computational models used for health care—
depends on knowledge goods that are not protectable under many IP laws:
(1) aggregated data; (2) algorithms; and (3) validation. W. Nicholson Price II,
Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421, 443–46 (2015). He thus
argues for increased use of grants and prizes in these areas. Id. at 449–54.
Given the high cost and likely global benefits of developing black-box medical
algorithms, id. at 437–42, a global black-box medicine institute might be
worthwhile.
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200

zation.” (Except in cases of “national emergency,” a signatory
state also must make “efforts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms” before it can
201
make unauthorized use of the patent.)
A third caveat is that if SA can prevent other purchasers of
the relevant knowledge good from reselling to SB, then SA might
attempt to demand a payment from SB in excess of PB|monopoly. If
SA has complete control over resale, such that SB can acquire
the relevant knowledge good only through a direct transaction
with SA, then TBA could conceivably take any value in the
range [PB|monopoly, BB(x)]. Yet even in that extreme case, TRIPS
effectively sets an upper bound of BB(x) on the transfer TBA
from SB to SA. SB will never (or never rationally) pay more for a
knowledge good than it stands to benefit from making the
knowledge good freely available to its own citizens. As we discuss below, this last feature of the international IP regime is a
potentially significant benefit relative to other mechanisms for
setting the size of transfers from consumer states to producer
states.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL IP LAW
So far, we have argued that for a subset of knowledge
goods, coordination among nation-states can address the underinvestment problem—i.e., the problem that nation-states acting
on their own will invest in the production of global knowledge
goods at less than the socially optimal level. We have also argued that the international IP regime offers at least a partial
solution to the problem: by requiring consumer nation-states to
make transfers to nation-states that produce global knowledge
goods, international IP law ensures that producer states internalize at least some of the cross-border benefits generated by
their (and their citizens’) knowledge production efforts. It is not
immediately obvious, however, why nation-states have chosen
international IP law as the framework for determining those
200. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31. From January 1995 to June 2011, there
were twenty-four instances in which countries threatened to issue compulsory
licenses for pharmaceuticals, most of which ended in either compulsory licenses or voluntary price reductions. Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database
Analysis, 9 PLOS MED., Jan. 2012, at 3. Aggressive price regulation may delay
the launch of new drugs in that state. See Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patents and
the Global Diffusion of New Drugs 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20492, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20492.pdf.
201. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31(b).
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transfers. As we discussed in Part I.B, states generally subsidize the production of knowledge goods through a range of
mechanisms beyond IP laws. By the same token, nation-states
conceivably could use non-IP mechanisms to mediate transfers
between consumer states and producer states. Why, then, have
nation-states united on IP treaties rather than arrangements
202
involving alternatives to IP?
One answer might be that alternatives to IP such as prizes,
grants, and tax credits require some sort of public finance system, and there is no global public finance system (or, at least,
not much of one). Suzanne Scotchmer argued that IP treaties
exist because “there are no institutions to harmonize public
spending, and there are no international mechanisms to repat203
riate the spillovers it generates.” To be sure, there are international finance institutions with limited policy objectives, such
as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (the latter of which has invested more than $18 billion in R&D efforts
204
over the past decade). But this is perhaps no more than a
quibble; a more substantive objection is that Scotchmer’s answer just repeats the question. Why have countries chosen to
coordinate on IP instead of non-IP mechanisms? It is no response to say: because they haven’t set up non-IP mechanisms.
This Part attempts to offer a more thorough answer to the
“Why international IP?” question. Our account is partly explanatory and partly justificatory. That is, our goal is not only
to understand why—as a positive matter—nation-states have
chosen international IP laws as a coordination mechanism, but
also to explain why—as a normative matter—coordination
around IP makes sense. Importantly, the two questions are not
entirely separate. The puzzle of why states have chosen to coordinate on IP—and why the international IP system has persisted—becomes less of a puzzle the more rational that decision

202. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing such proposals). We are unaware of any proposals for global treaties using non-IP incentive mechanisms for creative works—another indication that international
IP scholars should be wary of lumping patents and copyright under one umbrella.
203. Scotchmer, supra note 23; see also SANDLER, supra note 86, at 76
(“The absence of a supranational government with taxing authority makes the
standard tools of public finance . . . more difficult to apply at the transnational
level.”).
204. World Bank Group Support for Innovation and Entrepreneurship,
WORLD BANK GRP., http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/world-bank
-group-support-innovation-and-entrepreneurship (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
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seems to be. Even if our account does not perfectly describe the
thoughts that went through the minds of government officials
when they chose to coordinate on IP in the first place, it helps
to explain why the regime has proven to be relatively stable.
Our account is not a simple story about administrative
costs. We are agnostic as to whether the administrative costs of
the international IP regime are higher or lower than the administrative costs of alternative coordination mechanisms. Indeed, if the function of international IP law is to establish a
framework for setting the size of transfers from consumer nation-states to producer nation-states, then IP might seem like a
very cumbersome means of achieving that objective. Rather
than relying on the administrative costs justification, we instead focus on two features of the international IP regime that
strike us as normatively attractive: (1) international IP law
leaves nation-states with significant flexibility to develop their
own mechanisms for incentivizing innovation and allocating access to knowledge goods; and (2) international IP law sets reasonable bounds on the size of transfer payments from consumer
nation-states to producer nation-states.
In Part IV.A, we explain our doubts about the administrative-costs justification for IP as a coordination mechanism. In
Part IV.B, we consider alternative arguments for and against
an international IP regime. We close in Part IV.C with a consideration of the distributive effects of international IP and its
alternatives.
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS STORY
We have argued that the international IP system serves as
a mechanism for setting the size of transfers between states
that consume knowledge goods and states that produce those
goods. Yet IP is not the only conceivable mechanism for mediating those transfers. One could imagine a regime whereby each
nation-state agrees to contribute a fixed percentage of GDP to
an international organization, and the organization then chooses promising research projects to finance with grants. Alternatively or additionally, the international organization could offer
prizes to the first inventor who comes up with a vaccine for a
particular disease or a treatment achieving specific results. Or
perhaps the organization could simply set the size of TBA at the
end of each year based on each country’s consumption and production of knowledge goods over the previous twelve months
(e.g., “South Korea—your idea for transparent trucks was a
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clever way to reduce road accidents, so you deserve compensa205
tion from other states”).
The international IP regime may have advantages over
these alternatives, but is one of those advantages the fact that
IP saves on administrative costs? The answer is not obviously
“yes.” The rules of the global IP system may seem straightforward: countries are required to grant copyrights for creative
works and patents for technical inventions for a set period of
time (under TRIPS, no less than fifty years from publication for
206
copyrights and twenty years from filing for patents), and are
required to conform their IP laws to other specifications set
forth in treaties. In practice, however, the global IP system is
often costly and inefficient. The costs of acquiring international
patent protection include filing fees for each jurisdiction, costs
of local patent attorneys or other representatives, and translation costs, making the process infeasible for all but large com207
panies. Licensing and enforcement costs are also significant.
We have previously estimated the administrative cost of U.S.
patent acquisition and litigation (but not including negotiation
208
and licensing costs) to be on the order of $10 billion per year.
Copyright is far less costly on the acquisition side due to the in209
ternational ban on copyright “formalities” but copyrighted
works (unlike patents) are not indexed or searchable. This, in
turn, leads to transaction, negotiation, and litigation costs that
210
often exceed the benefit from using a copyrighted work.
The effectiveness of the current international IP system at
setting the size of transfers between states also depends on
highly variable substantive and procedural rules at the domestic level. IP rightsholders have complained of difficulty enforc211
ing their rights in many countries, including not only China
205. See Heather Kelly, Samsung Working To Make Trucks ‘Transparent,’
CNN MONEY (June 22, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/22/technology/
samsung-safety-truck.
206. TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 12, 33.
207. See TRIMBLE, supra note 80, at 35.
208. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 364–65.
209. See TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 9(1) (incorporating Articles 1 through
21 of the Berne Convention); Berne Convention, supra note 49, art. 5(2) (specifying that copyrights “shall not be subject to any formality”).
210. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS
DIGITIZATION
(2015),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan
-works2015.pdf (describing the high costs of finding owners for many copyrighted works).
211. See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 345 (2013).
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and India, but also higher-income countries such as Japan
214
and Italy. The availability and speed of injunctions and dam215
ages varies significantly between countries.
IP rightsholders also face significant uncertainty about
whether a given knowledge good will be protected in a given
country. Even in the United States, patentable subject matter
and copyright fair use are difficult to specify with any preci216
sion.
To be clear, we are not arguing against variation in domestic TRIPS implementation; there are many benefits to an ex217
pansive interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities. Our point is
merely that the international IP system has significant costs
for both private users and for nation-states that want to ensure
218
their treaty partners are in compliance. Thus, whatever the
justification for using IP as a coordination mechanism, it can-

212. See India Last in Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement
Rankings, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://articles.economictimes
.indiatimes.com/2014-01-30/news/46828590_1_property-protection-india
-protection-and-enforcement.
213. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Competition Law and Patent Protection in
Japan: A Half-Century of Progress, A New Millennium of Challenges, 16
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 71, 82 (2002) (“Limited discovery, limited use of expert
witnesses, high burdens of proof of causation and damages, and the absence of
judicial authority to increase damages for willful infringement, as well as high
attorneys’ fees and filing fees have all been cited as features of the Japanese
IP enforcement system that deprive IP owners of a meaningful private remedy
for infringement in Japanese courts.”).
214. The defensive strategy of filing a declaratory judgment action in Italy—with its notoriously slow procedures—to delay patent litigation elsewhere
in Europe was so widespread that it became known as the “Italian torpedo.”
See Claudia Rehse, The ‘Torpedo’: Recent Developments in Europe, INTELL.
PROP. MAG., Apr. 2014, at 76, 77.
215. See generally COTTER, supra note 211 (comparing patent remedies).
216. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015) (outlining recent obstacles to patenting diagnostic
methods); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433
(2008) (advocating for particularity in fair use decisions). Given the difficulty
of creating one workable system of fair use, it is perhaps unsurprising that
TRIPS does no better at standardizing limitations on copyright than a vague
three-part test: “Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rights holder.” TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 13.
217. See, e.g., supra note 59 and accompanying text.
218. In theory, it might be possible to design a system of truly global IP
protection and enforcement, but it is not obvious that the negotiation and administration costs of such a system would be an improvement on the status
quo.
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not be because coordination on IP is easy. International IP laws
are difficult to design and even more difficult to enforce.
Of course, alternatives to international IP cannot be implemented costlessly either. But there are a number of examples of successful international coordination on incentives for
technical knowledge beyond patent law, suggesting that alternatives may indeed be feasible—or at least no less feasible than
global patent treaties. Countries have often collaborated on
joint scientific endeavors in which they each contribute direct
funding. The International Space Station has cost approximately €100 billion ($110 billion), split over almost thirty years
among the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and ten Eu219
ropean countries. Another massive scientific collaboration,
the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), has an operating budget of
about $1 billion per year, which was split among twenty-three
member countries plus additional observing countries (such as
220
the United States) in 2014. The Global Influenza Surveillance
and Response System, a transnational network of influenza
scientists, produces annual flu vaccines and is financed by an
estimated $56 million a year in contributions from a number of
221
nation-states.
Some attempt toward larger-scale cross-border coordination on R&D has been made in the European Union. Since the
2000s, the European Commission has set broad innovationrelated framework goals, including an objective of increasing
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP to one percent for public

219. How Much Does It Cost?, EUR. SPACE AGENCY, http://www.esa.int/
Our_Activities/Human_Spaceflight/International_Space_Station/How_much_
does_it_cost (last updated May 14, 2013); see also NAT’L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN., FY 2016 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST SUMMARY 1 (2015),
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/NASA_FY_2016_Budget_
Estimates.pdf (budgeting over $3 billion per year for the U.S. contribution to
the International Space Station).
220. See Alex Knapp, How Much Does It Cost To Find a Higgs Boson?,
FORBES (July 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/07/05/how
-much-does-it-cost-to-find-a-higgs-boson#da1eb7764f08; Don Lincoln, US Participation in the Higgs Discovery, SYMMETRY (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www
.symmetrymagazine.org/article/october-2013/us-participation-in-the-higgs
-discovery; Facts and Figures 2014, CERN, http://press.cern/facts-and
-figures/facts-and-figures-2014 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
221. Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: The Flu
Network as a Case Study in Open Science 26–27 (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
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spending and three percent for all spending. Although the
specific spending goals are nonbinding, reviews have concluded
that this framework has led to a “dramatically increased focus
223
on science and technology in national political agendas” and
224
some cross-border policy learning.
While nation-states have experimented with several nonIP coordination mechanisms (and scholars have suggested still
225
other possible approaches), this does not mean the space for
solutions to the underinvestment problem has been thoroughly
mined. Perhaps the most intriguing possibilities arise with respect to goods for which the marginal return from additional
investment falls to zero after a certain point. So long as one
country invests up to that point, there is no need (and no use)
for additional investment. For such goods, states may actually
face an anti-coordination problem (more akin to “chicken” than
226
to a prisoners’ dilemma). This will be the case if multiple
countries would have an incentive to develop the good in a
world without trade. Put differently, a chicken problem exists
if, for multiple states Si, Bi′(x) > C′(x) for all x ≤ xglobal*, after
which Bglobal′(x) = 0. Thus, the globally optimal outcome can be
achieved if any one country invests xglobal*.
Under these circumstances, too many countries have an incentive to develop the good, so each has some incentive to wait
and hope the others will produce the knowledge first. In other
words, provision of these goods is hampered by free-riding but
not by uncompensated externalities. Since Bi′(x) > C′(x) for all x
≤ xglobal*, the fact that Bi′(x) < Bglobal′(x) is not an obstacle to optimal investment. Rather, the problem is that states are prone to
act strategically—and thus to invest less than they would un222. See generally Ouellette, supra note 59, at 114–15 (describing this
framework).
223. Nina McGuinness & Conor O’Carroll, Benchmarking Europe’s Lab
Benches: How Successful Has the OMC Been in Research Policy?, 48 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 293, 307 (2010).
224. REP. FROM THE EXPERT GROUP FOR THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE RESEARCH ASPECTS OF THE REVISED LISBON STRATEGY, THE OPEN METHOD OF
COORDINATION IN RESEARCH POLICY: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
25–26, 29 (Jan. 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/
eur_23874_texte_web.pdf; see also Ouellette, supra note 59, at 115 (citing additional sources).
225. See supra notes 16–17, 60–62 and accompanying text.
226. “Chicken” is an anti-coordination game in which the optimal outcome
is for players to take opposite actions, but each player prefers for the other to
take the more costly action (i.e., each would prefer to have the other country
invest). See Prisoners’ Dilemma, supra note 33, at 1487.
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der autarky with the hope that another country will pick up the
slack.
A concrete example may help illustrate. Imagine that researchers identify a new chemical compound that holds promise as a cure for heart disease, and that a clinical trial to determine whether the compound is effective costs an estimated
$100 million. Given that heart disease is one of the leading
227
causes of death worldwide, the expected benefits of conducting this trial likely exceeds its cost in many countries. Imagine,
in a world without IP treaties or other coordination, that the
United States, Germany, and Japan are each debating whether
to finance the trial. Under autarky—i.e., if each country were a
closed economy—each would immediately proceed. But given
knowledge flows across borders, each will hope that one of the
other countries will undertake the cost. This mutual waiting
may have desirable effect of preventing duplicative investment.
But it also may result in no state investing at all.
For this type of good (which one might call chicken-type
228
goods), one imaginable solution is an anti-R&D treaty. For
example, if Germany and Japan can credibly commit not to finance the trial, then the good becomes a cranberry-type good
from the perspective of the United States: either the United
States will produce the good (which is in its interest), or the
good won’t be produced. For the anti-R&D treaty to succeed, it
must draw the support of all but one country with the capabil229
ity and incentive to produce the good under autarky. Conced227. See Anthony S. Kim & S. Claiborne Johnston, Global Variation in the
Relative Burden of Stroke and Ischemic Heart Disease, 124 CIRCULATION 314,
318 fig.1B (2011) (showing that ischemic heart disease is one of the leading
causes of death worldwide, with a burden that is relatively uniformly distributed).
228. Not only do these goods present a game of chicken, but knowledge
about the health effects of eating chicken might fall into this category, given
widespread global chicken consumption. See Roberto A. Ferdman, The Coming
Global Domination of Chicken, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 14, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/14/the-coming
-global-domination-of-chicken.
229. Alternatively, an anti-R&D treaty might draw the support of all but
two countries with the capacity and incentive to produce the relevant
knowledge good themselves under autarky, thus reducing the coordination
challenge for the two remaining countries to a bilateral cooperation game.
More generally, if n equals the total number of countries with the capacity and
incentive to produce the relevant knowledge goods themselves under autarky,
then an anti-R&D treaty with n – x signatories reduces the challenge of producing the knowledge good from an n-country game to an x-country game. Only when x = 1 does the anti-R&D treaty eliminate the free-riding risk, but an
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edly, we know of no example of such an anti-R&D treaty in
practice: countries have sought to implement anti-R&D treaties
230
in other contexts (such as cloning-related research and nucle231
ar weapons research ), but the goal in those cases was for the
treaty to cover all n nation-states rather than n – 1 states. Our
point is not to push the anti-R&D treaty as a viable alternative
to the international IP regime, but instead to emphasize that
there are numerous imaginable solutions to distinct coordination problems for different types of knowledge goods.
Finally, while large-scale R&D treaties (or anti-R&D treaties) are not observed in the real world, tax treaties are. And
tax treaties, like IP treaties, can address the free-rider problems highlighted by the standard account above. Countries can
agree not to tax (or to tax at reduced rates) profits on
knowledge goods, thus amping up incentives for innovation. Indeed, the Model OECD Convention implements a system
somewhat like this: if a resident of Country X receives revenue
from the use of her patent in Country Y, she is not taxed in
Country Y unless she “carries on business” in Country Y “in
which the royalties arise through a permanent establishment
situated therein and the right or property in respect of which
the royalties are paid is effectively connected with such perma232
nent establishment.”
In short, we see no a priori reason why the transaction
costs involved in negotiating and enforcing an international IP
treaty are likely to be lower than the costs of other potential coordination mechanisms. Indeed, one might think that international IP law is quite a cumbersome way to set the size of TBA.
If the case for international IP rests on the administrative costs
story, it is an uneasy case indeed.
B. A QUALIFIED DEFENSE OF INTERNATIONAL IP TREATIES
In our view, a stronger argument for international IP law
as a mechanism for setting the size of transfers from consumer
anti-R&D treaty with x > 1 may still make production of the knowledge good
more likely.
230. See Warren Hoge, U.S. Drops Effort for Treaty Banning Cloning, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/20/world/us-drops
-effort-for-treaty-banning-cloning.html.
231. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
232. MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON
CAPITAL ART. 12 (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 2014), http://www
.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-articles.pdf.
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nation-states to producer nation-states arises out of our observations in Part III regarding the separability of international
and domestic IP policy. Those observations might translate into
a normative argument in favor of a global IP accord along the
lines of TRIPS: such an accord allows each signatory state to
decide for itself how it will incentivize innovation and allocate
access to knowledge goods at the domestic level, while also allowing producer states to pass some of the production costs
along to other countries that use knowledge goods. In other
words, TRIPS allows each country a measure of autonomy at
the domestic level, subject only to the constraint that no country can use a knowledge good generated in another signatory
state without the other state’s consent (or without the consent
of the inventor in the other state who patented the product in
question).
To be sure, the use of IP as a global coordination mechanism does not guarantee total freedom of choice for individual
states with respect to innovation incentives and allocation of
access at the domestic level. As discussed above, each TRIPS
signatory must maintain an IP system and must offer rewards
at least as attractive as those a knowledge producer could expect from IP. A country’s right to use knowledge goods originating elsewhere also remains subject to the producer’s veto. And
the potential for bargaining frictions is considerable, as producers and consumer nations each seek to capture the surplus
from trade. So too, the use of IP as a global coordination mechanism is likely to lead to a transfer of wealth from nations that
are primarily users to nations that are primarily producers.
(We consider this issue in Part IV.C.)
Moreover, this “autonomy advantage” is not entirely
unique to IP. If, for instance, TRIPS were replaced by a global
prize system financed by mandatory national contributions, individual countries still could adopt alternative mechanisms to
encourage domestic innovation and still could use a price
mechanism to allocate access to knowledge goods at the domestic level. For example, imagine that a global prize fund offers a
reward for the first team to invent a successful vaccine for the
common cold. The United States could decide that intramural
government research is the most promising strategy for coming
up with a cure and could assign a group of scientists at the NIH
to pursue the project. If the NIH scientists were the first to succeed, the federal government could claim the prize itself. And if
the United States thought that access to the cold vaccine
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should be allocated on a user-pays basis, it could finance its
contribution to the global fund by imposing a tax or fee on patients who receive the vaccine.
Other potential international policies are somewhat “stickier,” in the sense that they make it harder for any one country
to adopt a different approach. Say that countries agree to establish an international R&D organization, again funded through
mandatory national contributions, that will dispense grants to
university researchers across the globe who are pursuing promising projects. A country that preferred to rely on the market
(or on intramural research) could still do so, but it would have
no way of getting other states to share a portion of the costs.
The country could, though, still choose how to finance its contribution to the international organization—e.g., through a
broad-based tax or through a targeted tax on knowledge goods
that replicates the user-pays aspect of the IP system. So while
it is not the case that all potential international innovation policies are completely separable from domestic ones, it is the case
that convergence around an international IP regime, an international prize fund, or an international R&D organization
would still leave wide leeway for states to choose different ways
to finance innovation themselves.
The international IP regime is distinct from alternative coordination mechanisms such as a global prize fund or a global
R&D organization in one important respect: as noted above, the
transfer from a consumer nation-state to a producer nationstate in an international IP regime (TBA) is bounded. Even
with some amount of price discrimination, TBA ≤ BB(x). A producer cannot charge a consumer state more than the consumer
state stands to benefit from the producer’s knowledge good. The
consumer state will reject any deal that requires it to pay more
than it gets.
To be sure, there may be cases in which a patent is granted
for an invention that is obvious, or in which a patent is granted
to an applicant who was not the first discoverer. Note, though,
that consumer nation-states retain a powerful hedge against
this risk: they can decline to grant a patent for any invention
233
that is not “new” or that does not “involve an inventive step.”
Thus, if producer nation-state SA grants a patent to a domestic
applicant for an “invention” that is obvious, and the domestic
applicant then seeks protection in SB, then SB has the option to
233. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27(1).
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deny the application. If SA disagrees with that determination,
its only legal recourse is to resort to the dispute resolution
235
mechanisms set forth in TRIPS.
No such assurance exists with respect to a global prize
fund or a global R&D organization. As discussed above, nationstates are likely to favor spending on knowledge goods for
which domestic benefits are large relative to global benefits: the
United States, for example, almost certainly has more interest
in treating diabetes than treating diarrheal diseases (even
though the two types of ailments kill approximately the same
236
number of people worldwide each year). Depending on who
controls the levers of power, a global prize fund or global R&D
organization might divert more of its spending to “first-world
problems” than to the dilemmas facing lesser-developed nations. And it seems to us a safe assumption that wealthier nations will exert outsized influence on whatever international
institution might replace the IP regime. At the very least, the
international IP regime has the following argument going for it:
citizens of poorer countries don’t have to pay for knowledge
goods that they don’t use. A global prize fund or global R&D organization financed by mandatory national contributions offers
no such guarantee.
Our focus on the separability of international and domestic
innovation incentives also suggests that some of the criticisms
of international IP law are misplaced. Consider, for example,
Scotchmer’s worry that international IP law will lead to
deadweight losses that could be avoided if R&D were publicly
237
financed. This concern follows from the view that the IP
shadow tax, as the equivalent of a concentrated sales tax, imposes greater deadweight losses than other innovation incentiv238
izes financed via broad-based taxation. But as we emphasized
in Part III, harmonized IP protections at the international level
do not preclude any individual nation from relying on broadbased taxation to finance the allocation of knowledge goods at
234. Id. art. 27(1) n.5 (“For the purposes of this Article, the term[ ] ‘inventive step’ . . . may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with . . . ‘nonobvious’ . . . .”).
235. See id. art. 64.
236. The Top 10 Causes of Death, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who
.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/ (last updated May 2014). Diabetes is
much more prevalent in high-income countries, and death from diarrheal disease is much more common in low-income countries.
237. Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 436.
238. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 54.
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the domestic level: absent a complete bargaining breakdown, a
state will be able to purchase a license to a patented knowledge
good from the producer at a price equal to or less than the value of the good to its own citizens, and can then choose to make
the good available to its own citizens at marginal cost (or for
free). So even if proprietary pricing does impose greater
deadweight loss than broad-based taxation, that does not mean
that harmonized IP protection is itself inefficient.
At any rate, the assumption that proprietary pricing imposes greater deadweight loss than taxation does not necessarily hold for all countries. The assumption depends on the existence of a reasonably efficient domestic finance system—a
condition not everywhere found. Countries differ dramatically
in the structure of their tax systems and in the size of the re239
sulting deadweight loss from revenue raising. Meanwhile, the
deadweight loss from proprietary pricing under an IP regime
depends on the elasticity of demand for the patented product.
For instance, if demand is perfectly inelastic (i.e., if consumers
will purchase the same quantity regardless of price), then the
240
deadweight loss of proprietary pricing is zero. In that event,
reliance on IP will be more efficient than all but the ideal tax
241
system.
The efficiency of conventional public finance mechanisms
versus the IP shadow tax will vary not only with the efficiency
of the tax system, but also with other characteristics of the
state, including both its bureaucratic capabilities and political
economy constraints on what policies it is able to promulgate.
Amy Kapczynski notes that the IP literature “typically describe[s] the state in its first instance as inertial, heavy, bureaucratic, ill-informed, and perilously corruptible and cor242
Mariana Mazzucato has recently challenged that
rupt.”
pessimistic view of the state, arguing that for numerous breakthrough technologies, the state has in fact acted as “a lead risktaker and market-shaper” rather than “an inert bandage for
239. See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the
Size of Government, 46 J.L. & ECON. 293, 335 tbl.D1 (2003) (showing summary
statistics for measures of tax efficiency).
240. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43
n.11 (2004).
241. For a more elaborate argument suggesting that the optimal innovation policy involves a mix of proprietary pricing and financing through broadbased taxation, see E. Glen Weyl & Jean Tirole, Market Power Screens Willingness-To-Pay, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1971 (2003).
242. Kapczynski, supra note 5, at 131–32.
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areas underserved by the market . . . .” We do not think that
either one of these visions will always prevail. Government-set
rewards depend on state officials acting in the public interest,
and are thus unlikely to succeed in nation-states with high lev244
els of corruption or inefficient bureaucracies. Market-set re245
wards such as tax incentives and patents give less discretion
to state officials, but they still depend on the ability of the state
to design efficient systems for screening the projects that receive either type of reward.
The key point is this: for some products and in some countries, proprietary pricing will be more efficient than taxation as
a means of raising revenue to finance innovation, while for other products and in other countries, the reverse will be true. We
cannot confidently say that on balance efficiency considerations
weigh in one direction or another in the IP-versus-non-IP debate. Efficiency considerations do suggest, however, that optimal innovation policy is country- and case-specific. A prize system may be inefficient for countries in which the deadweight
loss from taxation is high and demand for the prized invention
is inelastic. At the same time, another country with a betterfunctioning tax system—and where demand for the relevant
knowledge good is more elastic—may want to finance innovation through broad-based taxation rather than propriety pricing. Thus, to the extent that efficiency arguments point in any
direction, they point in favor of global arrangements that allow
for diversity and maximize domestic autonomy.
C. DISTRIBUTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Critics of the international IP regime frequently focus on
246
the distributive consequences of IP rights. According to Peter
Gerhart, “It is the distributive dimension of intellectual property policy that makes existing international institutions such an
243. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 9–10 (2013).
244. Cf. Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://
www.transparency.org/cpi2014 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) (reporting perceived
public sector corruption across countries).
245. The description of tax incentives as a “market-set reward” may surprise readers unfamiliar with our prior work. Elsewhere, we have noted that
in the case of R&D tax credits and patent boxes, “nongovernment actors decide
which inventions are worth pursuing and which projects are most likely to
yield the inventions in question” while “[t]he government simply enhances the
ultimate reward.” Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 332.
246. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
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unsound mechanism for determining global rules for intellectu247
al policy . . . .” Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai conclude that
harmonization of IP protections across countries “has more to
do with distribution than with efficiency, and that incorporation of such provisions in a treaty like TRIP[S] might well bene248
fit the North at the expense of the South.”
We do not dispute the claim that international IP treaties
such as TRIPS, insofar as they strengthen IP protections in
consumer countries, will increase the wealth of informationproducing nations. But international IP treaties are only one
element within the constellation of policies affecting the global
distribution of wealth. Every year, industrialized nations transfer significant sums of wealth to poorer countries—through official development assistance as well as other mechanisms. In
2013, official development assistance from twenty-eight
249
wealthy countries to poorer nations totaled $134.8 billion.
Wealthy countries enjoy substantial autonomy over the amount
and allocation of their foreign aid budgets—a fact that no international IP treaty can change. Thus, if an international IP
treaty such as TRIPS enriches wealthy countries at the expense of their poorer counterparts, wealthy countries can offset
that redistribution of wealth via direct transfers. Conversely, if
TRIPS were replaced by an IP regime that shifts wealth to
poorer countries, wealthy nations could counterbalance that
250
shift by reducing their foreign aid outlays. At the end of the
day, wealthy nations decide whether—and how much—they
wish to redistribute wealth across borders. Unless a new IP regime results in a North-to-South redistribution of wealth that
exceeds the existing amount of foreign aid (a possibility we
251
international IP treaties will dictate the
think unlikely),
form—but not the sum total—of global wealth redistribution.
247. Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143,
144; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
248. Grossman & Lai, supra note 5, at 1650.
249. Foreign Aid Reaches Record High, THE GUARDIAN (April 8, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/08/foreign-aid
-spending-developing-countries.
250. Just because wealthy nations could counterbalance redistribution
through IP with adjustments in foreign aid does not mean that they would. As
discussed in Parts II.C and II.D, the behavior of nation-states is not always
best described through rational actor models, and it is possible that domestic
lobbyists could be more successful pushing for IP rules that benefit foreign
countries than for more direct foreign aid.
251. By one estimate, TRIPS resulted in a net rent transfer of $5.76 billion
(in 1995 dollars) to the United States. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL
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This is not to say that the distributive consequences of international IP treaties are nil. International IP treaties likely
lead to transfers of wealth among industrialized nations—
transfers that cannot be offset through changes in the amount
of foreign aid (since industrialized nations do not typically give
252
foreign aid to each other). Some might consider such transfers to be normatively desirable based on a user-pays princi253
ple. Others might argue that even if the distributive consequences of international IP treaties are largely limited to the
industrialized world, egalitarians ought to oppose policies resulting in wealth transfers from industrialized nations with
lower per-capita GDPs to the United States and Germany (the
primary TRIPS beneficiaries). Note, though, that the international IP regime does not always benefit richer industrialized
nations at the expense of middle-income ones: some of the net
losers from TRIPS (e.g., Norway) have higher per capita in254
comes than some of the net winners (e.g., Italy). The key
point is that once one recognizes that the North-South distributive consequences of international IP treaties can largely be offset through adjustments to foreign aid, the normative debate
over international IP treaties takes on a different tone. One
might favor the redistribution of wealth from industrialized nations to developing countries while also believing that userpays is an appropriate framework for allocating the costs of information production within the industrialized world. On that
view, the distributive consequences of international IP treaties
such as TRIPS begin to look quite attractive.

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 184 tbl.6.1 (2000); see also Phillip
McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International
Patent Harmonization, 55 J. INT’L ECON. 161, 179 tbl.4 (2001) (estimating that
TRIPS resulted in a net transfer of $4.553 billion for patents applied for in
1988). Meanwhile, U.S. foreign aid in 1995 totaled $12.3 billion, and U.S. foreign aid has more than doubled (in real-dollar terms) since the mid-1990s. See
CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 29–
31 tbl.A-2 (2011). These figures suggest that even if TRIPS were entirely eliminated, the United States could easily offset the distributive consequences of
that (dramatic) reform by reducing its foreign aid outlay.
252. See McCalman, supra note 251, at 179 tbl.4 (calculating that Canada,
Brazil, and the United Kingdom were the biggest net losers—in absolute
terms—from the transition to TRIPS).
253. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 350–51 (discussing the
normative arguments for and against a user-pays approach).
254. See McCalman, supra note 251, at 179 tbl.4.
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Critics of the international IP regime might respond that
even though the distributive consequences of international IP
law can be offset through foreign aid, political considerations
255
make such offsets unlikely. After all, “more foreign aid” is
256
rarely a winning platform plank in a rich-world democracy.
Yet those who criticize international IP law on distributional
grounds bear the additional burden of showing that their preferred alternative—whether it be a global prize fund, a global
R&D organization, or some other mechanism—would yield a
more desirable distributive outcome. If wealthy producer nation-states have managed to use international IP law to extract
rents from consumer nation-states, what is to prevent wealthy
producer nation-states from using a global prize fund or a global R&D organization to extract rents as well? Until critics of international IP law can answer that question, the case against
international IP law on distributive justice grounds will be as
uneasy as the case for international IP law on administrative
cost grounds.
CONCLUSION
Readers of our prior work might at this point expect a recantation. In an earlier article, we advocated for “innovation
policy pluralism,” arguing that a mix of IP and non-IP incentives is in most cases preferable to exclusive reliance on IP
257
alone. Here, we defend (with qualifications) an international
status quo that is (with exceptions) principally oriented around
IP. Are these two positions inconsistent?
To the contrary, we think that our analysis of international
IP law strengthens the case for innovation policy pluralism at
the domestic level. One concern regarding the use of non-IP innovation incentives at the domestic level is that nation-states

255. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit
in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2016) (noting, in the domestic
context, that “political action costs” may stand in the way of “efficient” redistributive schemes).
256. See Kevin Robillard, Poll: Most Only Want Foreign Aid Cuts, POLITICO
(Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/poll-most-only-want
-foreign-aid-cuts-087948. But see Everything You Need To Know About the
Parties’ Platforms, from Taxes to Terrorism to the Environment, NAT’L POST,
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/everything-you
-need-to-know-about-the-parties-platforms (last updated Oct. 13, 2015) (noting
that the Liberals, who went on to win a decisive victory in the October 2015
Canadian federal election, promised to “[r]everse the decline in foreign aid”).
257. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 310.
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that subsidize knowledge production through such mechanisms
will not be able to internalize the benefits that accrue to other
258
states. In this Article, we have offered several reasons why
that concern is misplaced. As we demonstrated in Part II, not
all knowledge goods are global public goods—and even for global public goods, nation-states may have strong incentives to
subsidize production through public finance mechanisms under
certain circumstances. And as we showed in Part III, nationstates that subsidize knowledge production through non-IP incentives at the domestic level still can use international IP law
to secure partial compensation from consumer states. Meanwhile, international IP law leaves consumer states free to experiment with non-price-based mechanisms for allocating access to knowledge goods. And unlike IP at the domestic level,
international IP law need not lead to any deadweight loss from
259
proprietary pricing.
In sum, international IP law does not direct nation-states
as to how they should incentivize innovation or allocate access
to knowledge goods at the domestic level. Instead, the role of
the international IP regime is to set the size of transfers from
states that consume knowledge goods to states that produce
them, while leaving both consumer states and producer states
with substantial autonomy over the production and consumption of knowledge goods inside their own borders. The international IP regime thus does not supplant nation-states as the
principal players in innovation policy. Rather, international IP
law expands the range of innovation policy possibilities that
nation-states can explore.

258. See id. at 367–68.
259. This is not to say that international coordination around non-IP
mechanisms is necessarily misguided. It is only to say, as emphasized
throughout, that international coordination on IP does not stop states from
adopting IP alternatives at the domestic level—and in some circumstances
may make it easier for states to do so.

